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United States v. Scotto: Progression of A Waterfront
Corruption Prosecution From Investigation
Through Appeal*
I. Introduction
Anthony M. Scotto, a man whom Governor Hugh Carey de-
scribed as "trustworthy, energetic, intelligent, effective and edu-
cated,"' was convicted in federal district court on November 15,
1979, on charges of racketeering, accepting unlawful labor payments,
and income tax evasion. Both Scotto and his co-defendant, Anthony
Anastasio, were ranking union officials in the International Long-
shoremen's Association (I.L.A.), the powerful union representing
American stevedores. Scotto and Anastasio specifically represented
the Brooklyn longshoremen in New York.
This note uses United States v. Scotto to examine the progression
and ramifications of a complex waterfront corruption case. In partic-
ular, the note examines the development of the Scotto case from inves-
tigation through appeal, and the practical effect which the
prosecution and conviction has had on waterfront corruption. This
note is written for the practitioner who desires an overview of a com-
plex racketeering case.
II. Background
The New York docks have been overridden with illegal activity
since the turn of the century. Loansharking, extortion, kickbacks and
theft are routine on the piers2 because of the unique geographical
features of New York City and the nature of the shipping business. 3
The New York harbor has no direct link with a railroad line.4 As a
* United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980). The Scotto case illustrates the
historical and legal development of a complex federal racketeering case brought under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976). The
reader should not view the detailed discussion as commenting either on the defendants' guilt
or innocence or on the merits of any legal issues raised during the course of the judicial
process.
1 Welling, On The Waterfront, BARRON'S, Jan. 21, 1980, at 4 [hereinafter cited as
Welling].
2 See Blakey & Goldstock, The Investigation and Prosecution of Organized Crime and Labor Rack-
eteering, CORNELL INSTITUTE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, LABOR RACKETEERING: BAcK-
GROUND MATERIALS 1-61 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Blakey & Goldstock].
3 D. BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY 178 (1962) [hereinafter cited as D. BELL].
4 Id.
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result, longshoremen must load the incoming cargo onto waiting
trucks for distribution. Congestion is common.5 The shipping busi-
ness, furthermore, is seasonal and cyclical by nature, subject to
weather, port delays, the overall economy, and other variables. 6 Fi-
nally, the cargo may include perishables that require immediate un-
loading to avoid spoilage.
7
These factors account for two of the most prevalent criminal ac-
tivities on the docks: the "loading racket" and "kickbacks." 8 The
loading racket evolved from the trucking industry's great need for
speed. Narrow piers and waterfront steets made it impossible to load
more than a few trucks at a time. During World War I, waiting time
became the most expensive aspect of trucking.9 The truckers resorted
to hiring helpers to cut down on loading time; however, the prices
charged increased 'with the demand for services. Truckers quickly
learned they could speed the unloading process by paying an addi-
tional "hurry up" fee.' 0
The kickback, on the other hand, has been a more traditional
form of criminal activity, caused by the fluctuation in the number of
ships arriving daily in the New York harbor. This fluctuation made
it difficult for employers to estimate how many laborers they would
require each day. Consequently, the shipowners hired more workers
than necessary, and each morning chose the needed men from the
work pool. The remainder loitered on the piers, hoping to be chosen
later in the day or the next morning. An employee's willingness to
"kick back" a portion of his wages to the unloading foreman gener-
ally guaranteed that he would be chosen from the work pool."
Because the New York docks were a center of both illegal activ-
ity and high profits, the docks were an inviting target for infiltration
by organized crime.' 2 One commentator concludes that loading
rackets were the principle incentive for such infiltration.' 3 During
the 1920's, the underworld gangs fought fierce battles for control of
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 2, at 41-42.
8 Consumers are the ultimate victims of these illegal activities. Concerning illegal activ-
ities on the docks, FBI deputy associate director for criminal investigations James B. Adams
stated: "What makes this so devastating is that there's only one real victim: the consumer.
Everyone else can get out of what he has to by passing the cost along to the consumer." N.Y.
Times, Mar. 2, 1978, at 1, col. 3.
9 D. BELL, supra note 3, at 184.
10 Id.
11 Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 2, at 22.
12 Id. at 21.
13 J. HUTcHINsoN, THE IMPERFECT UNION 98 (1970).
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the loading rackets on the New York west side docks. 14 The nature of
the waterfront work force, primarily composed of uneducated and
unskilled immigrants, made the work force easy to manipulate.' 5
Those who desired a piece of the waterfront action found that
control of the union locals was a prerequisite to conducting racket
operations on the piers.t 6 Organized crime figures gradually became
integral parts of the I.L.A.17 By 1950, thirty percent of the I.L.A.'s
officers had police records.' Once in control of the unions, the un-
derworld discovered other types of racketeering schemes, such as
"strike insurance." Capitalizing on the shipping industry's need for
speed, individual pier bosses regularly exacted payments from ship-
pers by threatening walkouts. t9
Organized crime infiltration in the union started slowly, but in-
creased substantially during the union presidency of Joseph P. Ryan
from 1927 to 1952.20 In 1937, Albert Anastasia, reputed to have ties
with the organized crime murder for hire network, "Murder, Inc.,"
assumed control of six Italian locals of the I.L.A.2I Under Anastasia's
leadership, organized theft, kickbacks and loansharking on the piers
reached unprecedented levels. 22 Anastasia soon became the "abso-
lute ruler of the Brooklyn waterfront. ' 23 He later arranged for his
14 D. BELL, supra note 3, at 168. Peace was eventually established among the organized
crime "loading bosses" in the 1930's through Varick Enterprises, Inc., a "mob cooperative"
that divided the total profit from all the piers among the various gangs. See Blakey & Gold-
stock, supra note 2, at 21 n.84.
15 Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 2, at 21.
16 Id See V. JENSON, STRIFE ON THE WATERFRONT 100 (1974).
17 David Dubinsky characterized the I.L.A. as a "nest for waterfront pirates-a racket,
not a union." D. DUBINSKY & A. RASKIN, DAVID DUBINSKY: A LIFE WITH LABOR 164
(1977). Daniel Bell wrote that the I.L.A. was "less a trade union than a collection of Chinese
warlords, each ruling a great or small province." D. BELL, supra note 3, at 165. Elia Kazan
brought the essence of life on the waterfront to the screen in his 1954 classic, "On The Water-
front" with Rod Steiger and Marlon Brando. G. Robert Blakey states "[T]he I.L.A. is virtu-
ally a synonym for corruption in the labor movement." Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 2, at
20.
18 V. JENSON, sura note 16, at 100. The criminal records were for arrests and convic-
tions on felony charges. Id.
19 Id.
20 Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 2, at 22. See D. BEL, supra note 3, at 191.
21 The six locals were referred to as "Camarda locals" after the influence of International
Vice-President Emil Camarda. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 2, at 23.
22 H. NELLI, THE BUSINESS OF CRIME 244 (1976).
23 P. MAAS, THE VALACHI PAPERS 201 (1968). A rival gang executed Anastasia in a
Manhattan barber shop in October, 1957. The Catholic Church denied Anastasia a church
funeral, and he was buried in unconsecrated ground. The Church did not refuse a church
funeral again until July, 1979, upon the death of organized crime figure Carmine Gallanti.
N.Y. Times, July 16, 1979, at 1, col. 3.
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brother, Anthony "Tough Tony" Anastasio24 to become president of
Local 1814, the largest of the I.L.A. locals. When "Tough Tony"
died on March 1, 1963, his son-in-law succeeded him as president of
Local 1814.25 His son-in-law was Anthony M. Scotto.
Scotto was described as a "rising star in the labor world where it
was assumed he would soon succeed Thomas W. Gleason as presi-
dent of the 116,000 member I.L.A., and perhaps eventually. . . take
the reins of the AFL-CIO. '26 In 1979, he was described by the New
York Times as the dominant and most popular I.L.A. chief in the
New York area, largely because of his successes in winning a guaran-
teed annual wage, free medical and dental care and other benefits for
dock workers.27 Scotto has also held many civic posts in New York
and has lectured at various colleges and universities.
28
Scotto was born in the tough Red Hook waterfront section of
Brooklyn in 1934, where both his father and grandfather had been
dockworkers. In the early 1950's, Scotto too started working on the
docks on weekends and summers. He eventually attended Brooklyn
College where he studied political science with the goal of eventually
entering law school. After two years of college, however, he dropped
out to pursue a full time career on the waterfront. 29 By 1957, he was
the business administrator of a health clinic operated jointly by the
I.L.A. and the New York Shipping Association (NYSA), a conglom-
erate of waterfront employers. He held various other union posts un-
til his father-in-law's death in 1963, when Local 1814 elected Scotto
its president. 30 The I.L.A. soon elected Scotto its vice-president.
Scotto began to build his reputation as a political power broker,
quickly molding his union local's cash raising ability and manpower
into a viable political force.31 Scotto actively supported President
24 The brothers disagreed as to the proper spelling of their last name. Albert insisted on
the "a," while "Tough Tony" preferred the "o." N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1979, at 3, col. 6.
25 Scotto's co-defendant, Anthony Anastasio, is his cousin.
26 Welling, supra note 1, at 8.
27 N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1979, § D, at 15, col. 4.
28 Scotto has lectured at such schools as Harvard University and the New School for
Social Research. He has served as president of the Maritime Port Council of Greater New
York, as a chairman of the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education, and as a trustee of
the Brooklyn Academy of Music. He has raised money for such philanthropic causes as the
Saint Vincent's Home for Homeless Boys and the Anthony Anastasio Foundation, which
provides scholarships for children of union members. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1979, § B, at 1,
cols. 3-4.
29 )'d. at cols. 5-6.
30 Ten locals merged in 1954 to form Local 1814, which became the largest in the I.L.A.
and the most powerful along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts. Id. at col. 6.
31 Welling, sufira note 1, at 24.
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Carter and Governor Carey, and was instrumental in both the re-
election of Mayor John V. Lindsey and the election of Lindsey's suc-
cessor, Abraham Beame. He also raised funds for Mario Cuomo's
unsuccessful mayoral campaign and helped to raise approximately
one million dollars for the 1974 Carey campaign. 32 Scotto served as
a New York delegate to the Democratic National Conventions in
1972 and 1976 and, in 1976, he toured Brooklyn with Presidential
candidate Jimmy Carter.
33
Scotto exerted considerable influence in New York state politics.
In July of 1975 the New York legislature, influenced by Scotto,
34
passed a bill which amended the state's workmen's compensation
law. The new law provided state payment for injuries to I.L.A.
members treated at the NYSA-I.L.A. clinic in Brooklyn. Scotto also
helped place men who "owed him" in city and state bureaucratic
positions. Scotto claimed responsibility for "recommending" numer-
ous bureaucrats to positions under Mayors Lindsey and Beame as
well as Governor Carey and enjoyed a working relationship with
such bureaucrats.
35
The federal government was aware of Scotto's ties to organized
crime, beginning with his marriage into the Anastasia family in 1957.
In 1969, the Justice Department identified Scotto as a "capocienda,"
or "chief," in the Carlo Gambino organized crime family. The find-
ing resulted from an investigation by Senator John McClellan's Sub-
committee on Organized Crime, 36 and from hearings by the
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor ("Waterfront Commis-
32 Wall Street Journal, Oct. 30, 1979, at 18, col. 1.
33 N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1979, § B, at 1, cols. 4-5.
34 Id.
35 At his trial, Scotto testified that he "caused the appointment" of Louis F. Mastriani as
Commissioner of Ports and Terminals. Id. Scotto was also influential in other appointments,
including: Arthur Cooperman, New York State Workmen's Compensation Board Chairman;
Howard Schulman, member of the Port Authority of New York-New Jersey; Paul Hall, Sea-
farer's International Union President (Hall later testified as a character witness for Scotto at
the trial. See note 100 infra.); Bert DiMattina, New York Shipping Association Vice-Presi-
dent, as New York State Insurance Fund Commissioner; John P. Laufer, Transportation As-
sistant Commissioner for Manhattan; and Louis Valentino, New York State Labor Affairs
Commissioner (Valentino also testified at trial in Scotto's defense, see text accompanying
notes 109-110 infra).
36 The Justice Department requires information from three independent sources before
making such an identification. Senator John L. McClellan (D. Ark.) has served as Chairman
of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and as Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field.
For the findings of Senator McClellan's Subcommittee on Organized Crime, see S. REP.
No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1969).
[December 1981]
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sion").37 Scotto vehemently denied these allegations, calling them
"anti-labor tactics"' 38 and political guerilla warfare.39 Other Scotto
supporters claimed that the move was a revenge tactic by the Nixon
Administration for Scotto's strong anti-war policy.40
In 1970, Scotto was called before the New York State Legisla-
ture Joint Committee on Crime. Although Scotto invoked his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination rather than answer
questions about his Mafia ties, the Committee's report listed Scotto
as an alleged organized crime figure. A few months later, both
Anthony and Marion Scotto appeared before the Waterfront Com-
mission 4' to respond to allegations of organized crime ties. Both in-
voked the Fifth Amendment a total of fifty-four times at the hearing.
The furor caused by the investigations eventually died down and the
Commission declined further action.42
III. Investigation and Indictment
In 1975, the FBI began an extensive investigation into union
racketeering on the docks. The investigation, termed UNIRAC (for
"union racketeering"), extended over the entire Eastern seaboard
37 A longshoreman on the Brooklyn waterfront, Salvatore Passolacqua, testified before
the Commission linking Scotto with organized crime figures. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 39 (1979).
38 Daniel Bell states that a reaction such as this is a common response to exposure and
has been since the 1950's. D. BELL, supra note 3, at 200.
39 In 1969, Scotto perceived that Attorney General John A. Mitchell and New York
Governor Nelson Rockefeller were political foes of his and the politicians he supported. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 17, 1979, at 1, col. 5.
40 Welling, supra note 1, at 24.
41 A compact between New York and New Jersey established the Waterfront Commis-
sion of the New York Harbor in 1953. Waterfront Commission Act of 1953, N.Y. UNCONSOL
LAws §§ 9801-9937 (McKinney 1974). It was established to eliminate criminal practices in
the handling of waterborne freight and regulate the employment of waterfront labor, previ-
ously subject to much abuse. See text accompanying notes 8-15 supra. The Commission has
two members, one chosen by each state, and may act only upon a unanimous vote.
The legislature gave the Commission broad powers to effect the purposes of the interstate
compact. Since 1953, it has attempted to clean up the waterfront by revoking the licenses of
those engaging in criminal activity. Some law enforcement agencies doubt the effectiveness of
the Commission. In 1979, several federal and state officials said they had withheld confiden-
tial information from the Commission concerning waterfront rackets because they suspected
leaks to organized crime. See note 57 infra. N.Y. Times, May 27, 1979, § IV, at 7, col. 4.
42 N.Y. Times, May 27, 1979, § IV, at 7, col. 4. Allegations of Scotto's link to organized
crime continued to surface. In 1978, a convicted loanshark named Gary Bowdach testified
under immunity before a Senate Investigation Committee that he had seen Scotto transfer
over $40,000 to an organized crime courier for Meyer Lansky, a reputed underworld figure.
Scotto denied these allegations. Id., Jan. 18, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 5.
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and Gulf Coast and involved more than 100 FBI agents.43 The FBI
conducted court ordered wiretaps in ten cities ranging from Manhat-
tan to New Orleans.44 UNIRAC resulted in charges against more
than 100 persons operating in eastern and gulf seaboard ports such as
Baton Rouge, Boston, Charleston, Houston, Miami, New Orleans,
Raleigh, San Juan, and Savannah. 45 Federal grand juries handed
down three indictments. The first was in June of 1978, when a
Miami grand jury indicted twenty-two persons for union racketeer-
ing, including ten men associated with the I.L.A.46
The other two indictments were handed down in New York.
The larger of the two was against eleven men and contained 213
counts.47 On January 19, 1979, Anthony Scotto, president of the
I.L.A. Local 1814, and Anthony Anastasio, vice-president of Local
1814 and Scotto's cousin, were indicted by a New York Grand Jury.
The fifty-three count indictment charged Scotto with violations of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),
48
43 Id., Sept. 11, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 1. An FBI spokesman termed the investigation "one
of the most extensive investigations in the bureau's history." Id.
44 Wiretapping was conducted in Manhattan, Brooklyn, Fort Lauderdale, Miami, Jack-
sonville, New Orleans, Mobile, Norfolk, Hoboken and Philadelphia. Id., Jan. 18, 1979, at I,
col. 2.
45 Welling, supra note 1, at 4.
46 Those people who were indicted and were connected with the I.L.A. were George
Barone and William Boyle, both International vice-presidents of the I.L.A.; Isom Clemon,
former president of an I.L.A. local in Mobile; Elizabeth Jackson and Robert Bateman, presi-
dents of the Savannah and Charleston I.L.A. locals, respectively; Fred R. Field, I.L.A. general
organizer; James Vanderwyde, office manager of a Miami local; Cornelius Vanderwyde, of-
fice employee of the Miami local; Cleveland Turner, president of Miami Local 1416; and
Landon Williams, I.L.A. International Vice-President and president of Local 1408 in Jack-
sonville, Florida. An eight month trial resulted in convictions of twenty-two. United States v.
Barone, 83 F.R.D. 565 (S.D. Fla. 1979). See N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1979, at 6, col. 5.
47 This indictment was filed after the Scotto indictment, in March of 1979. Four of the
eleven men charged in this indictment were I.L.A. officials. They were Michael Clemente,
New York Local 856 official before being barred from office for waterfront extortion in 1954;
Thomas Buzzanca, Manhattan Locals 1804 and 1804-1 President; Vincent Colucci, Newark
Locals 1235 and 1478-2 President; and Carol Gardner, Newark Local 1233 President. The
ether seven defendants were waterfront businessmen with connections to the I.L.A. such as
Tino Fiumara and Michael Coppola, reputed underworld figures. A key witness against
Scotto was also a key witness in this trial. William "Sonny" Montella testified that he made
payments to Buzzanca, Colucci and Gardner to obtain business for his company, Quin
Marine Services, a waterfront carpentry firm. See note 53 infra. See also text accompanying
notes 66-136 infra. After an eleven week trial, most defendants received heavy sentences.
N.Y. Times, June 22, 1980, at 35, col. 2. See United States v. Clemente, 494 F. Supp. 1310
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
48 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976). See generally H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d




the Taft-Hartley Act,49 mail fraud,50 and income tax evasion.51 The
indictment accused Scotto of receiving over $300,000 in illegal
payoffs in return for reducing the number of fraudulent workmen's
compensation claims and promising to use his influence to get addi-
tional business for certain waterfront companies.52 The bulk of the
$300,000 allegedly came from two waterfront companies, John W.
McGrath Services Corporation and Quin Marine Services, a Brook-
lyn subsidiary of McGrath Services Corporation. 53 The indictment
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection
of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the
meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indi-
rectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of
any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is en-
gaged in or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A
purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without
the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assist-
ing another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of
the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or
their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity of the collection of an
unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of
the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in
fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activites of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful
debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provi-
sions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
49 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1946, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976),
forbids any payment of money or other things of value by employers to a labor official, repre-
sentative, or organization. The Act also forbids demand and/or receipt of money or "other
thing of value" by any labor official, representative, or organization.
50 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
51 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7206 (1976). The indictment charged Scotto with failing to report
about $200,000 in taxable income he received between 1975 and 1977 (N.Y. Times, Jan. 18,
1979, at 1, col. 2) and with participating in a scheme to persuade a waterfront company,
Prudential Lines, to accept a questionable ten year lease for a Brooklyn warehouse. Two
officers of Prudential Lines, Marc D. Coppell and Keith L. Nelson, pleaded guilty to making
illegal payments connected with this charge. Two key government witnesses in this case nar-
rowly escaped being murdered by a spray of automatic gunfire while leaving their Newark,
New Jersey office on May 27, 1979. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1979, § B, at 2, col. 1. The govern-
ment later dropped the charges stemming from the lease from the indictment. See text ac-
companying note 64 infia.
52 N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1979, at 1, col. 2.
53 The indictment alleged that money also came from C.C. Lumber, Inc. in Brooklyn,
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charged Anthony Anastasio with participating in the RICO viola-
tions and sharing in illegal payments totalling $15,000 in violation of
the Taft-Hartley Act.
54
Reactions to the indictment were mixed. Scotto's attorney,
James La Rossa, described the indictment as "a finale of a 15-year
Justice Department vendetta against Mr. Scotto which has undoubt-
edly cost the taxpayers untold millions of dollars."' 55 Many
dockworkers and I.L.A. members interviewed in Scotto's home area
viewed Scotto as a victim of the government investigation, and be-
lieved he would ultimately be cleared.
56
The chief evidence against Scotto was obtained from court-or-
dered wiretaps, conducted by the FBI during the UNIRAC investi-
Marine Repair Services in Staten Island, and American Navigation Corporation of Balti-
more. All three companies had connections with the other two defendants named in the
Scotto indictment, Vincent E. Marino and Joseph A. Lacqua. Marino and Lacqua were
subsequently severed from Scotto and Anastasio because the former were indicted only on
Taft-Hartley misdemeanor counts. N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1979, at 44, col. 1. Lacqua, a former
district attorney in Brooklyn and a present officer of both the American Navigation Corpora-
tion and C.C. Lumber, Inc., was later acquitted on January 10, 1980. Id., Jan. 11, 1980, § B,
at 4, col. 2. Marino, however, was convicted in the same federal court. The jury found that
he paid Scotto almost $40,000 in kickbacks for business Scotto supplied. Id., April 8, 1980,
§ B, at 5, col. 2.
Two executives of the largest contributors, McGrath Service Corporation and Quin
Marine Services, testified for the government. See text accompanying notes 72-82 & 89-96
zina. These executives, William D. O'Hearn, President of McGrath Service Corporation,
and William "Sonny" Montella, General Manager of Quin Marine Services, pleaded guilty
to seven counts of violating 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (1976) (Taft-Hartley), and later testified that
they made illegal payments to Scotto and/or Anastasio. N.Y. Times, June 25, 1979, at 1, col.
2. O'Hearn testified that a drastic increase in fraudulent workmen's compensation claims in
1973 and 1974 threatened the survival of his company. Id. This was caused, in part, by a
1972 amendment to the Longshoremen's ana Harbor Workers Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(1976), which permitted an injured longshoreman's claims to be based on his own physician's
report, leading to what most of the industry agreed is a "racket" of filing fraudulent or exag-
gerated claims. Brief for appellee at 6, United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980)
(hereinafter cited as Government Brief).
O'Hearn stated that he and his partners "became aware that this was a racket. . . and
attempted to talk to Mr. Scotto to seek his assistance. . . ." N.Y. Times, June 25, 1979, at 1,
col. 2. See text accompanying notes 89-96 infra. O'Hearn received a suspended sentence.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1980, § B at 2, col. 5.
Montella pleaded guilty to two separate conspiracy counts to violate both the mail and
wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1976). He entered the federal witness protection
program on August 16, 1978. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1979, § B, at 3, col. 3. He also testified for
the government at the trial on the related indictment against Clemente and Fiumara. See
note 47 sufira.
54 N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1979, at 1, col. 3.
55 N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1979, at 1, col. 2. The federal government stated that La Rossa's
figure of "untold millions" was highly exaggerated. Welling, supra note 1, at 4.
56 N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1979, § B, at 3, col. 6.
[December 1981]
[Vol. 57:364]
gation.57 There was a total of 1100 hours of tapes at the conclusion
of the investigation.5 8
Scotto and Anastasio both pleaded not guilty at the arraign-
ment on January 25, 1979.59 Although La Rossa argued that the
court should require no bail for Scotto because he was "a good
enough risk for the President [Carter] to have lunch with . . .,,,60
unsecured bail was set at $50,000 for Scotto and $30,000 for Anas-
tasio.61 The case was assigned to Judge Charles E. Stewart, Jr., sit-
ting in the Southern District of New York.
A superseding indictment filed on July 31, 197962 added four-
teen counts to the original fifty-six counts, and charged Anastasio
with receiving an additional $50,000 in payoffs, including $4,000 al-
legedly received as recently as July 1, 1979.63 The government subse-
quently withdrew ten counts that involved a scheme to expedite a
questionable waterfront lease, payments by two severed defendants,
and a wire fraud charge against Scotto. 64 The RICO charges, Taft-




The jury selection for the anticipated seven week trial began on
September 12, 1979,66 resulting in a jury of eight women and four
men.67 The prosecution team consisted of the United States Attor-
57 The FBI obtained approximately thirty-two separate wiretap orders from sixteen dif-
ferent judges, naming Scotto in twenty-six orders. The wiretapping began in May of 1976
and continued until May of 1978.
The investigation revealed some unrelated facts that led to separate investigations. One
such incident was the suspension and eventual dismissal of Alphonso T. Pelaez, a high rank-
ing investigator for the Waterfront Commission for allegedly passing confidential information
regarding the waterfront investigation to Scotto. See Pelaez v. Waterfront Commission of
New York Harbor, 77 A.D.2d 947, 431 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1980).
58 N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1978, at 44, col. 1.
59 Id., Jan. 26, 1979, § B, at 4, col. 1.
60 Id. Scotto had lunch with President Carter on November 2, 1978.
61 Id.
62 Id., Aug. 24, 1979, § B, at 5, col. 4.
63 Id., Aug. 1, 1979, § B, at 3, col. 6.
64 Id., Sept. 11, 1979, § B, at 3, col. 1.
65 See notes 48-51 supra.
66 N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1979, at 23, col. 6. Selwyn Raab covered the trial for the New
York Times substantially from start to finish.
67 The foreperson of the jury was Janice Shaw, a research chemist. Among the other
jurors were an insurance broker, a retired minister, a mailman, a receptionist in a police
precinct, a New York State Labor Department employee, a school consultant, an anthropolo-
gist, a New York State Tax Department clerk, a sausage company manager, a phone opera-
tor, and a retired housemaid. Id., Nov. 12, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 1.
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ney for the Southern District of New York (U.S. Attorney) Robert B.
Fiske, and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Scott W. Muller and Alan Le-
vine. Scotto was represented by James La Rossa, and Anastasio was
represented by Gustave H. Newman.
In his opening statement on Tuesday, September 18, Fiske char-
acterized Scotto as a "corrupt and greedy official" who "demanded
and received $300,000 in cash in illegal payoffs despite a union salary
of more than $100,000 a year."'68 La Rossa, on the other hand, char-
acterized Scotto as a "responsible, sincere labor leader" with a sense
of civic duty.69 He outlined Scotto's defense, stating that any money
Scotto received was for political contributions and was passed on.70
This became known as Scotto's "conduit" defense. Newman used his
opening statement to attack the credibility of a key government wit-
ness, William "Sonny" Montella.
1
The government began its case-in-chief on Wednesday, Septem-
ber 19. Of the twenty-three witnesses called by the government,72
three were central to the government's case. The first was William
"Sonny" Montella, the general manager of Quin Marine Services, a
company involved in carpentry services for ships on the waterfront. 73
Montella revealed that he had personally paid at least $75,000 to
Scotto in return for Scotto's influence in preventing competitors from
taking away any of Quin Marine's business. 74 He testified he made
payments in 1976 according to an agreed upon schedule.7 5
Montella testified further that he had carried a concealed re-
cording device provided by the FBI to a July 13, 1978 meeting with
68 Id., Sept. 19, 1979, § B, at 3, col. 1.
69 La Rossa stated that Scotto was a "responsible, sincere labor leader" who improved
conditions on the docks, attracted business to the Brooklyn waterfront, and became "a viable
power in the political world." Id.
70 Id. Scotto's defense was that he merely violated New York Elections Laws-a misde-
meanor. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-118(b) (McKinney 1976) forbids receipt by any candidate or
political committee of more than one hundred dollars from any individual unless the money
is in the form of a check. Under N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-126(c) (McKinney 1976), it is a misde-
meanor for any person to aid in the acceptance of more than one hundred dollars in a form
other than a check. It was this section that Scotto contended he violated.
71 Newman pointed to Montella's prior convictions, and accused him of "lying, cheating
and stealing." N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1979, § B, at 3, col. 3.
72 Most of the government's witnesses were supporting witnesses. One such witness was
Morton Sills, the owner of a custom tailor shop in New York City. He testified that Scotto
bought $12,000 worth of custom tailored suits, mostly with cash. Id., Sept. 28, 1979, § B, at 4,
col. 4.
73 See note 53 suipra.
74 N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1979, § B, at 3, col. 1.
75 Montella stated that he made the first payment in late 1975, agreeing to pay $25,000 a
year--$5000 in March, June and September, and $10,000 at Christmas. Id See note 78 infra.
[December 19811
[Vol. 57:364]
Scotto in the men's room at the Drake Hotel in Manhattan. At that
meeting he gave Scotto $5,000.76 The government then introduced
recordings made during meetings between Montella and Scotto on
January 13, 1978, where Montella passed $10,000 to Scotto, 77 and on
March 13, 1978 where the two men reviewed their schedule of pay-
ments. 78 Montella also testified that he had built a $15,000 cabana
for Scotto's forty acre summer estate in the New York mountains as
part of his payment 79 and denied that any of his payments to Scotto
76 N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1979, at 1, col. 3. Montella stated that he used false invoices at
Quin Marine Services to raise the necessary cash. Id.
77 N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1979, at 1, col. 3. At the time of this recording, neither Scotto
nor Montella knew of the court ordered wiretap. Id. At the time of the recording, Montella
was late in making his 1977 final quarter payment. The conversation proceeded as follows:
Montella: Anthony, I was a little tardy in seeing ya, so I hope you understand.
Sometimes things are very difficult.
Scotto: I understand
Montella: Too, too, you know, I had to help, I had to help, uh, Walter. You
know, and so forth.
Scotto: Yeah.
Montella: And everything else.
Scotto: Yeah.
Montella: So it took me a little bit of time. Ah, a few things I wanted to talk
to you about, all right? Can I close the door?
Scotto: Sure.
Montella: This is for you. That's from me, ten thousand (sound of paper,
crumpled). Here you are.
Welling, supra note 1, at 28.
78 N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1979, at 1, col. 3. While Scotto and Montella did not specifically
discuss illegal payments, their conversation did concern the payment of money. A March 13,
1978 excerpt contained the following conversation, with Montella (M) recounting the ar-
ranged payoff schedule to refresh Scotto's (S) memory:
M: March, I gave you five.
S: Yeah.
M: June, I gave you five. September, I gave you five. And then December, I
gave you 10.
S: No, I know that, I just. . . thought it was earlier, but that's all right.
M: No. All the time it has been like that.
S: Right.
M: Because I would, you know, when you said..
S: I, I got a little screwed up, because...
M: A few days maybe, yes. But never months, never.
S: I got, I got screwed up because...
M: Because that was the bonus, you know.
S: I figured something. I figured it wrong.
M: Yeah.
S: See. I must have got screwed up when you did a double one at Christmas
every year.
Welling, supra note 1, at 28.
79 N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1979, at 1, col. 3.
NOTES
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
were for political contributions.80
During the five day cross-examination by La Rossa, Montella
admitted that he had lied, stolen and made illegal payoffs in the
past81 and had pleaded guilty to making illegal payoffs, to extortion
and to tax evasion.8 2 Montella also conceded that Scotto never actu-
ally steered any business to Quin Marine Services.
The key witness against Anastasio was Nicholas Seregos, the
owner of a ship repair company in Hoboken, New Jersey. 83 Seregos
reluctantly appeared under a court order of limited immunity.84 He
testified that he gave over $50,000 in cash payoffs to Anastasio be-
tween 1975 and 1979, most of it under a ten percent "kickback" ar-
rangement which was designed by Anastasio with Scotto's
approval. 85 Seregos raised the cash for these payoffs by disbursing
funds for non-existent purchases.
Newman cross-examined Seregos at great length regarding his
"totally different" testimony given under oath before the Waterfront
Commission in 1976.86 Seregos admitted that at times Anastasio re-
ferred business to him without receiving money. 7 La Rossa chal-
lenged business records produced by the government in which
Seregos had recorded the payments made to Anastasio. Because one
entry recorded a single payment twice, La Rossa argued that such an
80 Id., Sept. 26, 1979, § B, at 3, cal. 6.
81 Id., Sept. 22, 1979, at 1, cal. 3. Montella stated: "If I pleaded guilty to everything (all
prior payoffs and lies), I'd be looking at 100 years." Id. He admitted not only stealing money
from Quin Marine, but also stated he tried to take over a bar by force by putting a hot blow
dryer on his victim's neck to force him to sign over ownership papers. Montella also said that
lying was the "only way to do business on the waterfront." Id.
82 Id See note 53 supra.
83 Id., Sept. 28, 1979, § B, at 4, col. 4.
84 The government gave Seregos immunity from prosecution for payments he made to
Anastasio. See note 85 infra. A grand jury later indicted Seregos for his participation in an
unrelated corruption scheme, for which he was convicted. See United States v. Seregos, No.
579 Cr. 569 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 1980), rehearing denied, No. 80-1403 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1981).
85 N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1979, § B, at 4, col. 4. Seregos kicked back to Anastasio ten
percent of the amounts received from two shipping companies, Prudential Lines and United
States Lines, for their repair business. Seregos said he made the first payment in 1976, and
the last payment of $4000 on July 5, 1979. Anastasio requested this last payment for "helping
Mr. Scotto pay his attorney fees," which resulted in the government making additional
charges against Anastasio. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
86 Seregos testified before the Waterfront Commission in 1976 that he never paid any
money to Anastasio and never spoke to Scotto. Seregos explained at trial that he lied to the
Waterfront Commission because he was afraid of losing a multi-million dollar Navy contract.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1979, at 40, col. 1. On redirect, he said he lied because he did not want
to admit to a crime. Id., Oct. 30, 1979, § B, at 10, cal. 4.
87 Id. Anastasio's defense strategy was to deny ever receiving any money, whereas Scotto




error demonstrated a lack of accuracy.""
The government presented the third of its key witnesses on Fri-
day, October 4, calling Walter D. O'Hearn, the president of Mc-
Grath Services Corporation.89 O'Hearn greatly damaged Scotto in
six days of testimony. He stated that he met with Scotto in April,
1974, in an attempt to decrease the fraudulent accident claims that
were costing his company over one million dollars a year.90 O'Hearn
agreed to pay Scotto $5,000 a month, and an extra payment at
Christmas, for Scotto's assistance in reducing the number of claims.9'
O'Hearn testified he had paid a total of $210,000 in cash to Scotto
until November of 1978.92 The prosecution then produced taped
conservations to establish how Scotto and Anastasio had divided the
money. 93 O'Hearn verified that there was a dramatic decrease in ac-
cident claims filed after the payoffs began.
94
88 N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1979, § B, at 10, col. 4.
89 Before O'Hearn was called, the prosecution called a few minor witnesses to establish
that Scotto had an inordinate amount of ready cash. One such witness was Joseph Lane, an
automobile dealer in Kingston, New York. He testified that Scotto put a $1000 cash down
payment on a new Mercedes Sports Coupe, with the $25,000 balance being paid by a Local
1814 maintenance man with a yearly income of $15,000. The balance was paid in bank
checks, and the car was registered in the name of the maintenance man. The government
introduced tapes from March of 1978 wherein Scotto discussed the arrangement with Steven
Krosnick, the maintenance man. Scotto explained to Krosnick that the reason for the clan-
destine purchase was to avoid tax payments. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1979, § B, at 14, col. 1.
Scotto was to later testify on cross-examination that the reason the car was purchased in this
surreptitious manner was due to the request of an unnamed "old family friend" who wished
to give the car to Scotto's children as a gift. Id., Nov. 2, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 5. See note 122
incfa.
90 See note 53 supra.
91 O'Hearn stated that a different executive of McGrath Service Corporation, David Ro-
sen, actually met with Scotto initially and arranged the agreement. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27,
1979, at 27, col. 1. Rosen pleaded guilty to his complicity in the payoffs on January 23, 1980.
Id., Jan. 24, 1980, § B, at 1, col. 6.
92 N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1979, § B, at 3, col. 4. O'Hearn usually paid Scotto $15,000 quar-
terly. Scotto preferred face-to-face payoffs, which is evidenced by the first payment in August
of 1975 in the men's room of Michael's One, a Manhattan restaurant. Id. The payments
ended when O'Hearn agreed to cooperate with the government in November, 1978. Scotto
tried to contact O'Hearn on several occasions to inquire about payments, and was unaware
that O'Hearn was cooperating with the government. In one tape recorded message between
Scotto and Montella, Scotto complained that O'Hearn was backing out of their arrangement:
"[H]e's impossible to find. We had a deal. .. ." Government Brief, supra note 53, at 11.
93 One such conversation was recorded on December 21, 1977. In three minutes Scotto
and Anastasio split at least $30,000. Government Brief, supa note 53, at 21-22. In a Febru-
ary 10, 1978 meeting in preparation for an I.L.A. meeting in Miami, Scotto and Anastasio
divided $9,000 between themselves, each taking $2,500 and putting $4,000 in a "kitty." Id. at
22-23.
94 In 1974, accident claims on the Brooklyn docks totalled over $1.4 million. In 1976, the
figure dropped to $300,000. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1979, § B, at 3, col. 4.
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O'Hearn admitted on cross-examination that he made some
political contributions to Governor Carey's 1978 campaign, and
raised money for President Carter's campaign. 95 However, these
payments were made by check, and not in cash, as were the Scotto
payments.
96
The government completed its case-in-chief against both de-
fendants by establishing the tax evasion charges. 97 The case had
taken almost four full weeks to present. The government had
presented three major witnesses, twenty supporting witnesses, and
thirty-seven separate tapes.98
The defense opened on Wednesday, October 17. Scotto called
twenty-one witnesses, including nine character witnesses. 99 The im-
pressive list included two former New York City Mayors, various la-
bor leaders, and Governor Hugh Carey."0° In an unusual move, La
Rossa presented most of the character witnesses first, breaking the
flow occasionally to present the other defense witnesses. Former
Mayor John V. Lindsey stated that he regarded Scotto as "a man of
high integrity."10 New York State Supreme Court Judge William
C. Thompson testified that Scotto assisted in the desegregation of the
Manhattan docks.' 0 2 Former Mayor Robert F. Wagner called Scotto
95 N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1979, § B, at 20, col. 2. O'Hearn specifically recalled making a
$1,000 contribution to the "Friends of Governor Carey" in 1978. Id.
96 Id. On redirect, O'Hearn stated that McGrath Service Corporation contributed
$11,250 to various political campaigns between 1975 and 1978, but all contributions were by
check and all were legal. Id., Oct. 13, 1979, § B at 3, col. 5.
97 The evidence established that Scotto failed to declare on his federal income tax returns
payoffs amounting to $69,700 in 1975, $90,000 in 1976, and $16,500 in 1977. United States v.
Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1980).
98 The testimony of the government's three major witnesses, Montella, Seregos and
O'Hearn, occupied sixteen of the twenty-two days of testimony in the government's case.
99 N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1979, § B, at 3, col. 2. The press learned that Judge Stewart had
limited the number of character witnesses that each defendant could call to a reasonable
number.
100 Each of Scotto's character witnesses conceded on cross-examination that they were
unaware of the evidence against Scotto. The character witnesses appearing for Scotto, in
order of appearance, were former New York City Mayor John V. Lindsey; Paul Hall, presi-
dent of the Seafarer's International Union; New York Supreme Court Justice William C.
Thompson; Lane Kirkland, secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO; Morris Biller, president of
the New York area postal workers union; former New York City Mayor Robert F. Wagner;
Victor Gottbaum, head of District Council 37 of the American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees; William Shields, retired president of Barber Steamship Lines; and
Governor Hugh L. Carey.
101 N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1979, § B, at 3, col. 5. Lindsey admitted under cross-examination
that he was "embarrassed" by his association with Scotto after the Justice Department la-
beled Scotto an organized crime figure. Scotto had been instrumental in forming Lindsey's
Independent Party. Id See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
102 N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1979, § B, at 8, col. 3.
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"a man of integrity and ability-and a darned good labor leader." 10 3
The final character witness, Governor Hugh Carey, testified that
Scotto acted "on his conscience for what is right and not what is
popular."'1 4- On cross-examination, Carey admitted that the I.L.A.
had contributed $42,000 to Carey's 1978 campaign, and that Scotto
had made a personal loan of $20,000 (later repaid) to the same
cause. 0 5 Carey was apparently unaware of Scotto's "conduit" de-
fense theory, and conceded on cross-examination that he would not
testify as a character witness for Scotto if he thought Scotto had
made illegal contributions to Carey's 1978 campaign.
0 6
Scotto then presented other witnesses to combat the govern-
ment's case directly. To mitigate O'Hearn's testimony that Scotto
demanded money to assist in the reduction of fraudulent dock acci-
dent claims, Scotto called six witnesses.107 John J. Farrell, Jr., presi-
dent of International Terminal Operations Company, testified
concerning Scotto's efforts to reduce accident claims by longshore-
men. The other five witnesses gave similar testimony.108
Scotto attempted to refute Montella's testimony that money had
103 N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 1. Wagner associated frequently with Scotto
when Wagner ran Hugh Carey's 1974 gubernatorial campaign, and had Scotto's support as
mayor of New York City. Id.
104 Id., Oct. 27, 1979, at 21, col. 6. Governor Carey stated that he "would characterize
Mr. Scotto as a man who seeks public service outside the ambit of his union." Id.
105 Id., Oct. 25, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 1.
106 Carey's concession seriously undermined the effectiveness of his testimony. The gov-
ernment also proved that Scotto used his influence to end the 1979 newspaper strike in New
York City before Election Day in October of that year. Id., Oct. 27, 1979, at 21, col. 6.
A Carey spokesman later revealed that La Rossa assured Carey that he would not be
made to look like "the bad guy" by his testimony in the trial. Carey's aides stated in Novem-
ber, 1979, that Carey believed La Rossa honored the commitment despite Scotto's "illegal
contributions" defense. Id., Nov. 2, 1979, § B, at 14, col. 1. However, Carey himself stated in
November, 1979, that he felt La Rossa had an obligation to inform him of the defense before
Carey testified. Carey stated in a December 13th interview that "[I]t was never clear to me
how [Scotto's defense] would develop-not until it was too late." Id., Dec. 17, 1979, § D, at
14, col. 6. The appearance for Scotto may be a "no win" situation for Carey. Scotto's convic-
tion showed that Carey entertained a mistaken opinion of Scotto. Even if the jury had ac-
quitted Scotto, it may have believed that Carey's campaign accepted illegal campaign
contributions. Carey nevertheless testified, out of "obligation" to his friend of eighteen years.
Id But see note 138 infta.
107 The six witnesses called to counter O'Hearn's testimony were John J. Farrell, Jr., presi-
dent of International Terminal Operations Company; Joseph Byrne and Joseph Chiarello,
two waterfront businessmen; Alfred Small, a safety official of Local 1814; Saveri Galati, a
supervisor from Pittston Stevedoring Company; and Richard Toben, former terminal man-
ager for J.W. McGrath Corporation.
108 See note 107 sufira. For example, Galati testified that Scotto often visited the piers to
urge the workers to "cut down on accidents." N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1979, § B, at 3, col. 2. All
witnesses stated that Scotto never sought payment for this service.
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been passed between them by relying on his "conduit" defense.
Scotto argued that he did receive certain payments, but that he acted
only as an intermediary in passing the funds on to various political
campaigns. Theresa Mazzilli, Montella's secretary, testified that
Montella often complained about paying money to political cam-
paigns without getting credit for it, contradicting Montella's earlier
testimony, and supporting Scotto's defense. Scotto's next witness,
Louis Valentino, New York State Deputy Commissioner of Labor,
was an official in Mario Cuomo's 1977 mayoral campaign. Valen-
tino testified that he had paid $50,000 in cash to Cuomo's unsuccess-
ful 1977 mayoral campaign and that Scotto arranged the
transaction. 0 9 This testimony sparked an investigation by the New
York State Board of Elections, which later concluded Valentino may
have perjured himself. 1o
Joseph F. Colozza, a vice-president of I.L.A. Local 1814 who
worked in Carey's 1978 reelection campaign, testified that Scotto
gave him a $25,000 cash contribution for the Carey campaign in
June of 1978.111 On cross-examination, Colozza stated that he was
unaware of state laws requiring records to be kept of large cash con-
tributions. Neither Valentino or Colozza kept any records of the
cash that they said Scotto gave them."
2
Taking the stand in his own defense, Scotto admitted to taking
political contributions, but stated the amount he accepted was only
$75,000, not the $300,000 the government charged him with receiv-
ing. He stated he had "never taken a cent from Sonny [William]
Montella or anyone else" for his own purposes.1 3 Scotto also said he
paid Montella for the cabana built at his summer home in 1975.114
Scotto admitted that he received a total of $75,000 in cash from
109 N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1979, at 1, col. 2.
110 N.Y. Times, April 8, 1980, § B, at 5, col. 2. The Board of Elections investigation heard
from Michael G. Dowd, director of Cuomo's 1977 mayoral campaign, and Lorraine Romano,
who handled the day to day transactions in that campaign. Neither of the witnesses had any
knowledge of the $50,000 transaction. Valentino invoked his fifth amendment rights when
questioned about this and the Board recommended that the Manhattan district attorney
commence a perjury investigation. Id.
111 Id., Nov. 7, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 5.
112 Id. The government's rebuttal witness, Donald Bachmann, comptroller of Cuomo's
1977 mayoral campaign, stated that he never heard of the $50,000 cash contribution Valen-
tino testified to receiving. Id., Nov. 8, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 1. The official contribution records
of both the 1977 Cuomo campaign and the 1978 Carey campaign did not reveal the contribu-
tion. Id.
113 Scotto stated he became involved in politics to protect the interests of his union mem-
bers and the waterfront industry in New York. He said he told Montella and O'Hearn to get
together and raise money for candidates that would be helpful to the waterfront industry. Id.
114 See text accompanying note 79 supra.
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O'Hearn and Montella between 1977 and 1978, but testified that he
gave the money to the Carey and Cuomo campaigns."15 Scotto said
the tapes introduced by the government in which he accepted $5,000
in March, 1978,116 represented a payment towards a $50,000 com-
mitment to Cuomo's campaign.' 1 7 He went on to say that he deliv-
ered the money to the political campaigns and that he identified the
source of the funds. 118
Fiske's cross-examination of Scotto lasted three full days. Fiske
confronted Scotto with the public filings from both the 1977 Cuomo
campaign and the 1978 Carey campaign, 19 which included only two
$1,000 contributions by O'Hearn's corporations. Fiske then ques-
tioned Scotto about other illegal payments mentioned in the indict-
ment, and Scotto admitted giving two expensive tickets to a political
fund raiser (the "Lincoln Center Tribute to Governor Carey") to
Louis F. Mastriani, the former New York City Ports Commissioner,
in January of 1978.120 The government presented evidence to estab-
lish that Mastriani, in return, had expedited approval of a city lease
for the Northeast Maine Terminal waterfront project in Brooklyn, a
project that Scotto favored.'
2 '
Fiske then questioned Scotto about the large number of bills he
paid in cash. 2 2 Scotto explained he paid in cash to make it difficult
for the FBI agents who "followed and harrassed [him] ever since
1957" when he married Marion Anastasio. 23 Scotto reasserted his
"conduit" defense, and he asserted that he was unaware of state laws
115 Scotto testified that Anastasio delivered $50,000 to Valentino for the Cuomo cam-
paign in 1977, and $25,000 went to Colozza for the 1978 Carey campaign. N.Y. Times, Oct.
31, 1979, at 1, col. 1. Both Carey and Cuomo denied receiving any such money. Arthur D.
Emil, the treasurer of the Carey campaign, went further and declared that he never heard of
Joseph Colozza. Id. Scotto's testimony also conflicted with that of O'Hearn and Montella,
both of whom said the payments began in 1975. Id.
116 See Government Brief, .ufpra note 53, at 9-10.
117 Se text accompanying note 75 sufira.
118 N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
119 The campaign filings are required by N.Y. ELEC. LAw, § 14-108 (McKinney 1976).
120 N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 5. The tickets were each worth between $500
and $1000. Either Local 1814 or the Brooklyn Longshoremen's Political Action Fund paid
for the tickets. Mastriani was the New York City Ports Commissioner from March, 1976
through December, 1977. Id.
121 Welling, sufra note 1, at 26.
122 Scotto conceded that in one year he paid cash for several $700 suits, $16,000 for televi-
sion and stereo equipment, and for improvements on his 40 acre summer estate in Saugertos,
New York. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 5. Scotto also bought a 13% interest in
the 415 East 52 Street Corporation (a cooperative which owned a building worth $6.1 mil-
lion) for $26. Mastriani is a tenant in that building. Scotto did not explain how he acquired
the interest, worth over $700,000, for $26. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 5.
123 Id. An FBI agent familiar with the case maintained, however, that "Scotto would be
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prohibiting such contributions. 24 Scotto rested his case on Tuesday,
November 6, after two weeks of testimony. Anastasio's case, on the
other hand, lasted only one day and involved two witnesses. 125 He
did not testify in his own defense.
Closing arguments began on Friday, November 9, and ended
late Saturday afternoon. Levine summed up the government's case
by stating that "Mr. Scotto's own voice" on tape was the best evi-
dence in this case involving "greed, power and corruption."'
126
Anastasio's defense attorney, Gustave Newman, assailed the
government for taking tape excerpts out of context and attacked the
credibility of both Montella and Seregos. 12 7 La Rossa not only at-
tacked the credibility of Montella and O'Hearn, but joined Newman
in asserting that the government took excerpts out of context. La
Rossa reiterated Scotto's "conduit" defense, and characterized Scotto
as "a winner" who even had Governor Carey on his side.
128
U.S. Attorney Fiske, on rebuttal, pointed out that Scotto's
prominent character witnesses were not aware of the evidence
against Scotto, and emphasized the abuse of the union positions held
by both Scotto and Anastasio.
129
In an unusual Sunday session, Judge Stewart reviewed the sixty
count indictment against the defendants in a two hour jury
charge.' 30 The jury began its four day deliberation by requesting
and listening to three sets of tapes. 3 1 The jury also requested court
insulted" if he knew how infrequently the FBI actually followed him. Welling, supra note 1,
at 21.
124 N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1979, at 25, col. 1. Scotto was unable to explain why Montella
and O'Hearn did not simply pass the money directly to the campaigns instead of using Scotto
as a conduit. Id. Valentino was under federal subpoena to produce any records he had per-
taining to these contributions, but said he had none. Id.
125 Anastasio presented Dr. Kyrin Powers, the principal of Xavier High School in Brook-
lyn, as a character witness. He then called Anthony Valvo, a longshoreman, who testified
that Seregos was introduced to Anastasio in 1974, contrary to Seregos' testimony that he did
not meet Anastasio until 1975. Government Brief, supra note 53, at 29.
126 N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1979, at 25, col. 5.
127 Id.
128 Id., Nov. 11, 1979, at 40, col. 1.
129 Fiske also urged that a guilty verdict would show that justice applies to all people
regardless of position. The defense objected to Fiske's statement as being prejudicial, and
moved for a mistrial, which Judge Stewart denied. Id.
130 Judge Stewart read sixty-eight pages of instructions to the jury on November 11, 1979.
The instructions were the result of an all-day conference that took place November 8, 1979, in
chambers. Both sides submitted nearly 100 pages of proposed requests to charge. Govern-
ment Brief, supra note 53, at 30. The instructions were the focal point of the defendants'
appellate briefs. See text accompanying notes 174-273 inqfa.
131 The jury requested the tapes concerning a conversation between Montella and Scotto
on March 13, 1978, see note 78 supra, the July 13, 1978 tape concerning a payoff in the men's
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transcripts of Montella's testimony. The jury, in its third day of de-
liberations, requested the conflicting testimony of Scotto and
Montella regarding the cabana built at Scotto's summer estate.13 2
The jury also requested the tapes of the December 21, 1977 conversa-
tions intercepted from Scotto's I.L.A. office in Manhattan, in which
Scotto and Anastasio discussed splitting payoffs.133 On the final day
of deliberations, the jury requested the transcripts of Seregos' testi-
mony, and asked specifically for the portions in which Seregos dis-
cussed his records of the payments. 134 The jury also requested three
brief conversations between Scotto and Anastasio intercepted from
Scotto's I.L.A. office on February 10, 1978.135 On Thursday, Novem-
ber 15, 1979, the jury rendered a guilty verdict against both defend-
ants on most of the counts. 136 Judge Stewart set January 4, 1980, as
the sentencing date.
V. Reaction, Sentencing, and Ramifications
The reaction to the conviction was mixed. Scotto was
"shocked," and declared: "I know I am innocent."' 137 Both defense
attorneys stated that their clients would appeal. Hours after the
court announced the verdict, Carey issued a two paragraph state-
ment expressing sympathy for Scotto's family and urging the State
Board of Elections to investigate possible election law violations that
trial testimony may have revealed. 138 There were no immediate
room at the Drake Hotel in Manhattan, and the October 24, 1978 tape concerning a payoff in
a Manhattan restaurant. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1979, § B, at 3, col. 5.
132 Cf. text accompanying notes 74-75 (Montella's testimony) with text accompanying
note 113 (Scotto's testimony) supra.
133 See note 93 supra.
134 N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, § B, at 10, col. 1. Se text accompanying note 88 supra.
135 N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, § B, at 10, col. 1.
136 The jury found Scotto guilty of 33 of the 44 counts against him--the RICO violation
(Count one); RICO conspiracy (Count fifty); demanding and receiving unlawful "labor pay-
ments" totalling over $250,000 (Counts 2-9, 16-30, 34-37) and income tax evasion (Counts 54-
56). The jury found Anastasio guilty on 14 of the 27 counts against him-RICO conspiracy
(Count fifty); violations of the Taft-Hartley Act (Counts 35-45); and income tax evasion
(Counts 59-60). The jury was unable to reach a verdict on seventeen other counts alleging
additional Taft-Hartley violations and tax evasion charges. (Counts 10-15, 31-33, 46-49, 51-
52, and 57-58). United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 50.
Juror Lucille Brockway stated in a later interview that the jury didn't believe the cam-
paign contribution defense. "Most of us thought it was a cock-and-bull story-I called it a
fairy tale day that first time it came up in court." N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1979, at 27, col. 5.
The jurors cited the tapes as crucial to their decision, and the character witnesses' unfamiliar-
ity with them greatly detracted from those witnesses' testimonies. Id.
137 N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1979, at 1, col. 3.
138 Id., § B, at 2, col. 1. Carey, through a spokesman, stated that he "regrets that a person
of such considerable talent and ability has violated our laws." Id. Carey admitted later that
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comments from Lindsey, Wagner, or Judge Thompson. Cuomo was
"gratified" that the jury had exonerated his campaign from election
law violations.1 39 At least one character witness, Victor Gottbaum,
head of District Council 37 of the American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, was unconvinced by the ver-
dict. 40 There were mixed reactions on the waterfront in Scotto's
home section of Brooklyn.'
4 '
Scotto announced on November 16, 1979, that he would con-
tinue as union president pending appeals, citing the protections
granted under the Landrum-Griffin Act. ' 42 Jerome Klied, deputy di-
rector of the Waterfront Commission, however, stated that he would
move under § 8 of the Waterfront Commission Act of 1953143 to bar
waterfront employers from collecting any dues for Local 1814 if
Scotto and Anastasio refused to relinquish their union posts after sen-
he never knew the "other" Scotto. He dismissed as rumor the Justice Department identifica-
tion of Scotto as an organized crime figure. See text accompanying note 36 supra. Carey said
that even the late Robert F. Kennedy, former attorney general and Senator, had accepted a
$5000 campaign check from Scotto and the I.L.A. When Carey was told that the former
United States Attorney Robert Morgenthau suggested that Mr. Kennedy not associate with
Scotto, Carey said: "I wish Bob Morgenthau had told me that." Id., Dec. 17, 1979, § D, at
14, col. 6.
139 Cuomo expressed gratitude "that the jury said my campaign-and Pete Dwyer in
particular-were not involved in any illegality." Id., Nov. 16, 1979, § B, at 2, col. 1.
140 Gottbaum adamantly stated: "[T]welve people can't make me change my mind about
a friend I've known for years." Id.; see note 100 supra.
141 Some residents of Scotto's home area felt he had gotten a "raw deal" and took the
news of the verdict "like a death in the family." N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1979, § B, at 3, col. 1.
While some dockworkers felt the verdict was an injustice, others were afraid to speak out
against Scotto. Id., Nov. 17, 1979, at 27, col. 5.
The conviction did not ruin all of Scotto's political ties. Only days after his conviction,
he received an invitation to attend a fundraising dinner on behalf of Massachusetts Senator
Edward M. Kennedy. Ethel Kennedy handwrote a personal note on the invitation saying:
"Tony, I know these are troubled times. But please come." Id., Dec. 17, 1979 at I, col. 4.
142 The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, 29
U.S.C. § 504 (1976), forbids, interalia, a person convicted of a serious crime from serving in a
leadership capacity in any labor organization for five years following imprisonment and/or
probation. The Act defines the date of conviction as "the date of the judgment of the trial
court or the date of the final sustaining of such judgment on appeal, whichever is the later
event . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1976). Scotto argued he could retain his union post until
his appeals were exhausted.
143 Waterfront Commission Act of 1953, N.Y. UNCONSOL LAws, § 9933 (McKinney
1974), forbids any person convicted of a felony under either federal or state law from holding
union office. Unlike the Landrum-Griffin Act, see note 142 supra, § 8 of the Waterfront Com-
mission Act is a permanent bar to holding union office in New York, and does not define
"conviction." This section has been invoked to force approximately sixty-five resignations of
convicted union leaders in New York, and has withstood constitutional challenges. See, e.g.,
DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
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tencing. Scotto called the Commission's action "grossly unfair."'' 4
The Commission took no action, however, pending Scotto's sentenc-
ing in January.
On January 15, 1980, seven days prior to sentencing, La Rossa
filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that some of the jurors
had characterized Scotto as "a Mafia guy.' 45 The basis of the mo-
tion was an anonymous letter sent to Judge Stewart dated December
17, 1979, stating that "Scotto should be tried by jurors who have no
prejudice against Italian-Americans."' 46 Judge Stewart denied the
motion. 147
The court sentenced Scotto on January 22, 1980.148 Pleading
for leniency prior to sentencing, La Rossa said Scotto should not be
treated like a "common thief."149 Fiske responded that Scotto dis-
played "an arrogant contempt for the law," and committed crimes in
the "classic pattern[s] of racketeering."'' 50 Judge Stewart sentenced
Scotto on all counts consecutively, issuing an effective sentence of five
years imprisonment, followed by five years probation, and a $75,000
fine.' 5 ' While Judge Stewart could have given a maximum twenty-
year sentence for the RICO count, 52 he stated that pleas for leniency
from a "wide range of people," and Scotto's lack of a previous crimi-
144 N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1979, § B, at 1, col 6.
145 Id., Jan. 16, 1980, § B, at 2, col. 4.
146 Id. Fiske argued at the January 18 hearing that there was no proof that the letter was
sent by a juror.
147 United States v. Scotto, No. 80-1041 (S.D.N.Y. Jan, 1980). Stewart rejected defense
suggestions that a newspaper advertisement be placed requesting the author of the letter to
come forward. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1980, at 28, col. 2.
148 Judge Stewart changed the sentencing date from January 4 to January 22 in mid-
December, 1979. N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1979, § D, at 14, col. 6.
149 La Rossa stated: "He's not a common thief and he shouldn't be treated like one." Id.,
Jan. 23, 1980, at 1, col. 3.
150 Id., col. 4.
151 Scotto was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and a $25,000 fine on Count 1; con-
secutive one year terms of imprisonment on Counts 2-6, for a total of five years, to run concur-
rently with the sentence imposed on Count 1; $5,000 fines on Counts 2-6, totaling $25,000;
five years' probation on each of Counts 7-9 to run concurrently and to commence upon expi-
ration of the period of incarceration; $5,000 fines on Counts 16-20, totaling $25,000; a sus-
pended sentence and five years' probation on Counts 21-30 and 34-37; a suspended sentence,
five years' probation to run concurrently with the sentence imposed on Count 1, and a
$25,000 fine on Count 50; five years' imprisonment on each of Counts 53 and 55, to run
concurrently with the sentence on Count 1; and three years' imprisonment on each of Counts
54 and 56, to run concurrently with the sentence imposed on Count 1. United States v.
Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 50 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980).
152 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976) states that "[w]hoever violates any provision of section
1962 of this chapter shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both. .. ."
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nal record, accounted for the relatively light sentence. 153 Although
RICO contains a forfeiture clause whereby the government could
force Scotto and Anastasio to resign from their union positions, 54 the
court did not impose forfeiture on either Scotto or Anastasio.
155
Anastasio was sentenced to two years imprisonment, five years
probation, and a $5,000 fine.' 56 Judge Stewart again showed leni-
ency, having received many letters expressing "an unusual depth of
compassion and affection" for Anastasio.' 57 Both defendants were
free on bail pending their appeals.
While the appeal was pending, the Waterfront Commission sent
letters to Local 1814 and two organizations that collect and pay
union dues to the I.L.A., stating that unless Scotto and Anastasio
resigned, every collection of I.L.A. dues was a criminal violation of
§ 8 of the Waterfront Commission Act of 1953.158 Scotto filed a de-
153 N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1980, at 1, col. 4. Assistant United States Attorney Scott W.
Muller said the sentence was on the lighter end of the spectrum of sentences the government
wished imposed. Telephone interview with Scott W. Muller, Assistant U.S. Attorney, in New
York City (Aug. 18, 1981).
154 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976) states in part:
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter. . . shall
forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has acquired or maintained in viola-
tion of section 1962, and (2) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property
or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise
which he has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the
conduct of, in violation of section 1962 ....
155 Although there is scant mention of the forfeiture possibility in the record (see Brief for
appellant Anastasio at 36 n.32, United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980) (hereinaf-
ter cited as Anastasio Brief), Assistant U.S. Attorney Scott Muller said that the government
agreed to withdraw the forfeiture action after the convictions on the RICO counts. In RICO
prosecutions, the government usually presents the forfeiture case after the verdict on the
RICO charges. Although the defense moved to present all the issues to the jury at once,
Judge Stewart ruled that the court would bifurcate the issues. The government offered to
withdraw the section 1963(a) forfeiture issue if the defense would agree to have the Landrum-
Griffin prohibition against convicted felons holding union office apply. See note 142 sufira.
This prohibition, found in 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1976), would prevent Scotto and Anastasio
from holding any union office until five years after imprisonment and probation. Further, the
government knew that the Waterfront Commission Act of 1953 barred the defendants from
holding a union office in the New York-New Jersey area in the future. See note 143 supra.
Telephone interview with Scott W. Muller, Assistant U.S. Attorney, in New York City (Aug.
18, 1981).
156 Anastasio was sentenced to concurrent one year terms of imprisonment and concur-
rent fines of $5,000 on Counts 38-42; concurrent one year terms of imprisonment, consecutive
to the one year term imposed on Count 38, and concurrent $5,000 fines on Counts 35-37 and
43-45, the fines imposed concurrently with the $5,000 concurrent fines on Counts 38-42; a
concurrent two year term of imprisonment and concurrent $5,000 fine on Count 50; and a
suspended sentence and five years' probation on Counts 59-60. United States v. Scotto, 641
F.2d at 51, n.1.
157 N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1980, § B, at 1, col. 4.
158 Id., Feb. 1, 1980, § B, at 1, col. 5. See note 143 supra. The letters stated that Scotto's
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claratory judgment action in New York state court for a definition of
when "conviction" occurs under the Waterfront Commission Act of
1953. The state court rejected Scotto's position that conviction does
not occur until all appeals have been exhausted, 59 and on Septem-
ber 19, 1980, the New York State Supreme Court removed Scotto
and Anastasio from their union posts.160 The New York Court of
Appeals refused to hear Scotto's appeal.'6 1 Scotto then turned his
attention to his federal appeal on the criminal conviction.
VI. Appeal
The Second Circuit heard oral arguments on Tuesday, May 20,
1980, before Circuit Judges Oakes and Meskill, and District Judge
Bonsal. 62 The issues before the court dealt with the sufficiency of
the jury instructions, particularly concerning the RICO counts.
A. Oveview of RICO
Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act (RICO) as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, with the stated purpose of eradicating organized crime
in business. 63 RICO applies to a "pattern of racketeering activity,"
which is defined as the commission of at least two predicate offenses
("acts of racketeering activity") from a list of twenty-four separate
federal crimes and eight separate state crimes.'6 The commission of
and Anastasio's convictions disqualified them from union office under the Waterfront Com-
mission Act of 1953, and that collection of dues or assessments on behalf of the I.L.A. consti-
tuted a violation of the Act. Carol Gardner, an official of I.L.A. Local 1233 in New Jersey,
had been convicted in another trial resulting from the UNIRAC investigation, and the Com-
mission had sent similar letters to his local, as well as the NYSA and the MMCA. See note 47
supra. See also United States v. Clemente, 494 F. Supp. 1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The I.L.A. and
the AFL-CIO sued the Commission to enjoin enforcement of criminal actions under the Wa-
terfront Commission Act because section eight was being challenged as violative of the First
Amendment right of free association. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 495 F. Supp. 1108, 1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
159 Scotto v. Waterfront Comm'n, No. 80-5580 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 19, 1980), afd, 78 A.D.2d
686, 434 N.Y.S.2d 1004, - N.E.2d - (1980). See also note 142 supra.
160 Scotto v. Waterfront Comm'n, 78 A.D.2d 686, 434 N.Y.S.2d 1004, - N.E.2d -
(1980).
161 Scotto v. Waterfront Comm'n, 51 N.Y.2d 709, -N.Y.S.2d -, - N.E.2d - (1980).
162 Edward Bennett Williams of Washington, D.C., represented Scotto, and Michael E.
Tigar of Washington, D.C., represented Anastasio, on appeal.
163 Statement of Findings and Purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act, 84 Stat. 922
(1970). See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969). The wide range of legitimate
businesses reportedly infiltrated by organized crime included advertising, florist shops, car
dealerships, football franchises, real estate, and securities brokerages. Id.
164 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (A) (B) (1976) defines "racketeering activity" as including such acts
as: murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in narcotics,
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at least two acts of racketeering activity within ten years constitutes
the "pattern of racketeering activity."'165 Liability requires linking
the pattern of racketeering activity to the establishment or operation
of an "enterprise."'166 RICO is capable of many broad and varied
applications. 1
67
RICO sets forth four crimes:
(1) investment of income derived from a pattern of racketeer-
ing in an enterprise;168
(2) acquisition of an interest in any enterprise through racke-
teering activity;
169
(3) participation in any enterprise through racketeering ac-
tivity; 170 and
(4) conspiracy to violate any of the above proscriptions.
171
A violation of any of the above sections is punishable by a fine
not exceeding $25,000, imprisonment for twenty years, or both, plus
counterfeiting, embezzlement, mail fraud, wire fraud, obstruction of justice, interstate trans-
portation of stolen property, etc., punishable under either state or federal law.
165 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (5) (1976).
166 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976). See note 48 supra. "Enterprise" includes "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individ-
uals associated in fact, although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
The range of legitimate enterprises to which courts have applied RICO is broad. See,
e.g., United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 993
(1979) (restaurant serving as a "front" for narcotics operation); United States v. Brown, 583
F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979) (auto dealership); United States v.
Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978) (beauty college); United States v. Parness, 503
F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975) (foreign corporation); United States
v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (theatre); United States v. Frumento, 363 F.2d
1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978) (Pennsylvania Bureau of Cigarette and
Beverage Taxes); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
904 (1978) (police department). RICO encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enter-
prises. United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981).
167 Blakey & Goldstock, "On the Waterftont' RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 341, 348 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Blakey & Goldstock RICO Article].
However, certain legislators, judges, and commentators have expressed the concern that
the language of RICO is overly broad, and thus may be applied to persons outside the scope
of RICO's intended coverage. See, e.g., Atkinson, "Racketeer InAenced and Corrupt Organizations,"
18 US..C §§ 1961-68." Broadest of the Federal Cn'minal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. L. & C. 1, 18 (1978)
(RICO is a "sweeping act which intrudes on state power and has great potential for abuse");
Note, Racketeers and Non-Racketeers Alike Should Fear Florida's RICO Act, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
483, 506 (1978) ("broad definition of 'racketeering activity' makes the RICO statute a poten-
tial candidate for prosecutorial abuse"). See also Note, RICO.- Are the Courts Construing the Legir-
lative Histog Rather Than the Statute Itsef', 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 777 (1980); Tybor,
Racketeenng Law Facing K Test, 3 N.L.J. (Nov. 29, 1980) 1, 18; Tarlow, RICO. Someone Loaded
the Dice, TRIAL, Feb. 1981, at 54.
168 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976).
169 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976).
170 18 U.S.C. § i962(c) (1976).
171 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976).
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forfeiture of all illegal gains and any interest that the defendant has
acquired or maintained in a business or enterprise in violation of
RICO. 172 RICO also states that its provisions "shall be liberally con-
strued to effectuate its remedial purposes."
173
B. Arguments on Appeal
Scotto and Anastasio raised four major issues on appeal, all deal-
ing with the sufficiency of the jury instructions given by Judge Stew-
art. The government's response to all the arguments was that the
defense waived the issues by failing to raise them at trial.
1. Inadequate Jury Instructions on the "Conduct of the
Affairs" Element
Scotto argued that the court inadequately instructed the jury on
whether Scotto conducted the union's affairs through a "pattern of
racketeering activity," namely, the Taft-Hartley violations.174 Scotto
contended that Judge Stewart's instructions failed to require a nexus
between the Taft-Hartley violations (the "predicate offenses") and
the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise (the union).175 Scotto ar-
gued that RICO charges by their nature require precise jury instruc-
tions.1 76 The RICO statute is a "sweeping criminal statute" with
"great potential for abuse against individual defendants" and there-
fore requires the "wariest judicial supervision" to keep prosecutors in
check. 77 The court must instruct the jury not in "incommunicative
generalities," but in whatever specifics the facts of each case
172 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976). See note 154 supra. RICO restores the sanction of criminal
forfeiture that was abolished by the first Congress, Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat.
117 (1790). See Taylor, Forfeiture under 18 U. C. § 1963--RICOS -Most Powerl Weapon, 17 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 379 (1980).
173 Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). See
Blakey & Goldstock RICO Article, supra note 167, at 349-50. See also Tarlow, RICO: The New
Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 165, 177-80 (1980).
174 Brief for appellant Scotto at 10-22, United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980)
(hereinafter cited as Scotto Brief. The Taft-Hartley violations were the demand and receipt
of illegal labor payoffs in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 186(b) (1976). See note 49 supra. Labor
unions are ordinarily considered "enterprises" under RICO. See United States v. Kaye, 556
F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1977) (labor union local an "enterprise" under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976)).
The I.L.A. is also an enterprise that affects interstate commerce, a fundamental jurisdictional
requirement for RICO's application. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
175 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). See note 48 supra.
176 Scotto Brief, sura note 174, at 6.
177 Id. at 7. The brief stated that "since the racketeering activity itself may constitute 'the
enterprise,'. . . even if it consists of only a single individual, . . .RICO could easily be used
as oppressively as were letters de cachet in pre-Revolutionary France." Id.
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require. 178
Scotto urged that a crucial element of a section 1962(c) violation
is the accused's "conduct [of] the enterprise's affairs through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity."'179 The acts of racketeering in Scotto
which arguably constituted the- "pattern of racketeering activity"
were numerous Taft-Hartley violations that involved no acts by
Scotto in his capacity as a union officer.180 The mere commission of
such violations showed no connection between the pattern of racke-
teering and the operation of the enterprise, as RICO requires. The
court should have required the jury to find this nexus before convict-
ing Scotto.""' That is, the court should have instructed the jury to
acquit Scotto on the RICO charge unless the jury found "that there
was a connection between his receipt of the money and his conduct
of union business."' 82 Relying on Bollenbach v. United States, 183 where
the United States Supreme Court held that insufficient jury instruc-
tions will invalidate a conviction, Scotto urged the deficient instruc-
tions invalidated his RICO and RICO conspiracy convictions.184
178 Id. at 9.
179 Id. at 10-11.
180 Id.
181 Scotto pointed out that the "conduct of the affairs" element is insignificant when the
enterprise itself is the criminal activity. Id. at 14 (citing United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104
(2d Cir. 1976), cerl. denied sub nor., Napoli v. United States, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United
States v. Decidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979)). In cases where the enterprise is an estab-
lished, legitimate entity, however, the "conduct of the affairs" element is of paramount im-
portance and must be presented to the jury in clear terms. Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 14.
Scotto relied principally on the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in United States v. Nerone,
563 F.2d 836, 851-52 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. deniedsub nor., Hornstein v. United States, 435 U.S.
951 (1978), summarized in United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 395 (2d Cir. 1979).
182 Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 16. Scotto stated that the prosecution took an "extreme
position" in arguing that the "conduct of the affairs" element should be read out of RICO
relying only on dictum in United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afd,
527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976), for the proposition. The govern-
ment countered with United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aJ'd, 578 F.2d
137 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978). The court in Field held that § 1962(c) does
not require proofofa predicate act advancing the affairs of the union, or proof that the union
itself was corrupt. Section 1962(c) only requires that the government establish the defendant
committed the illegal acts in the conduct of the union's affairs. 432 F. Supp. at 58. The
government further relied on United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 921 (1977), although Scotto contended that his case was "totally antagonistic" to the
government's position. Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 16-19.
183 326 U.S. 607, 612 (1964).
184 Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 22. Scotto contended that tracking the statute's lan-
guage in the instruction was inadequate because the statute on its face does not clearly convey
the law. Id. (citing 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 485, at 293
(1969)). See also Lumetta v. United States, 362 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Perisco, 349 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir.
1961); Morris v. United States, 156 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1946). Further, the jury could not
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Anastasio joined in Scotto's arguments to the extent they were
applicable. 185 Anastasio also argued that the jury instructions on the
term "pattern of racketeering activity" were inadequate because they
failed to require a finding that the predicate offenses (receipt of ille-
gal labor payments) "were connected with each other by a common
scheme or plan which constituted an actual pattern, and not merely
a series of disconnected acts.' ' 186 Anastasio cited Senator McClellan's
properly infer the nexus between the payoffs and the conduct of the union's affairs from some
deliveries of money being made at Scotto's I.L.A. office. Scotto Brief, supa note 174, at 23
(citing United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 852 (7th Cir. 1977) (mere geographical juxta-
position is insufficient basis for the inference); United States v. Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197, 199
(E.D. Mo. 1978) (same)).
185 Anastasio Brief, supra note 155, at 28-44. Much of Anastasio's brief discussed the mis-
joinder of defendants under Fed. R. Crim P. 8(b) and prejudicial joinder under Rule 14.
Anastasio Brief, supra note 155, at 14. The misjoinder arguments emphasized the small
amount of evidence produced against Anastasio at trial. Among other things, he cited "sensa-
tional newspaper articles, all devoted solely to Scotto," and only 400 of the more than 7000
pages of trial transcript actually referred to Anastasio.
The government cited United States v. Papodakis, 510 F.2d 287, 300 (2d Cir.), cert de-
nied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975), and United States v. Turbide, 558 F.2d 1053, 1061-62 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977), and argued that Anastasio's participation in the events leading to
the RICO conspiracy charge warranted the Rule 8(b) joinder of Scotto and Anastasio. Gov-
ernment Brief, supra note 53, at 58. Anastasio's decision not to move under Rule 8(b) to
separate the RICO count against Scotto and the RICO conspiracy count against both Scotto
and Anastasio was a tactical move to avoid giving the government "two shots at Scotto."
Government Brief, supra note 53, at 62. The government also contended that the joinder of
the RICO count and the RICO conspiracy count was proper, since Rule 8(b) only requires
allegations that co-defendants participated in the same series of acts or transactions. Id. at 63
(citing United States v. Weisman, No. 79-1315, slip op. at 2252-55 (2d Cir. April 4, 1980);
Pacelli v. United States, 588 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979)). Fi-
nally, the government urged that any misjoinder was harmless error. Government Brief, supra
note 53, at 67.
186 Anastasio Brief, supra note 155, at 39-43. Judge Stewart gave the following instruction
on "pattern of racketeering activity":
[I]f you find that the requisite two or more deliveries or payments were requested,
received or accepted within the requisite time period, you must also find beyond a
reasonable doubt that any two of the deliveries or payments were connected with
each other, that is, that they were in furtherance of the same goal or served the
same purpose or were part of the same goal or served the same purpose or were part
of the same scheme or plan or series or had something else in common and were not
simply disconnected acts.
Id. at 39. The defense requested the following instruction:
A mere finding that two payments were made within the statutory period,
however, does not amount to a pattern of racketeering. In order to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that a pattern of racketeering existed you must find not only that
the two acts were committed, but that these acts were connected to each other by a
common scheme or plan which constituted an actual pattern, and not merely a
series of disconnected acts. You must find beyond a reasonable doubt a factual
nexus between the two payments, and that the two payments were part of a single
scheme or illegal plan, before you can find a pattern of racketeering activity. Ac-
cordingly you must find that the unlawful payments constituted part of a larger
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remarks concerning the necessary relationship between the predicate
offenses that establish a pattern of racketeering activity. 87 Anastasio
asserted that the failure to give his requested instruction was particu-
larly prejudicial to Anastasio since only three payments by Seregos
constituted the RICO conspiracy charge.'88
The government argued that the defense's submission of a writ-
ten instruction request and a "blanket objection" at trial was insuffi-
cient to preserve the issue for appeal. 189 The government further
responded that the court's instructions were in the "classic form" and
therefore adequate. 190 The government contended that the plain
meaning of the instruction's language adequately conveyed to the
jury the essence of the instruction.' 9' The government also distin-
guished the principal cases Scotto relied on, Huber and Nerone,192 as
irrelevant to the issue of jury instructions. 9 3 The government cited a
similar charge in Huber to illustrate the irrelevancy.94
pattern of activity which characterized the defendant's conduct of, or participation
in, the general activities of the I.L.A ...
Id. at A-4.
187 See J. McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S 30) Or Its Critics.- Which Threatens Civil
Liberties, 46 NOTRE DAME LAw. 55, 144 (1970) (hereinafter cited as McClellan). Scotto cited
a case decided after he filed his initial brief, United States v. Weisman, No. 79-1315 (2d Cir.
April 4, 1980), wherein the Second Circut held that the acts of racketeering activity must be
interrelated. Id. at 2235-39.
188 Anastasio Brief, supra note 155, at 43.
189 Government Brief, supra note 53, at 32 (citing United States v. Byrd, 542 F.2d 1026
(8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Williams, 521 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (blanket objection
insufficient to preserve issue for appeal)).
190 Government Brief, supra note 53, at 34. Judge Stewart first read 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)
to the jury, then recited the charges in the indictment, and then detailed the elements of the
crimes in his instruction.
191 The defendants insisted that the instructions contained "totally opaque language" in
stating the following: "while and as part of conducting or participating either directly or
indirectly in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise." Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 26.
The government replied that Scotto's contention "ignores the plain meaning of these words
and phrases." The government further stated:
[T]he court's choice of words was certainly within its broad discretion in framing
instructions. United States v. Wright, 542 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1073 (1977). The District Court need not use the precise language tendered by
a defendant as long as the substance is given and the charge is clear and fair.
United States v. Grezo, 566 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Wright
[542 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1976)].
Government Brief, supra note 53, at 36 n.
192 United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Nerone, 563
F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977).
193 Huber concerned a challenge to the allegations of an indictment, and Nerone concerned
a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence. Government Brief, supra note 53, at 38.
194 United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d at 395.
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2. Inadequate Jury Instructions on the Mens Rea Requirement
Scotto and Anastasio each argued that the court inadequately
instructed the jury on the mens tea issue.19 5 Scotto argued that, when
the RICO predicate offense is a Taft-Hartley violation, which is a
non-mens tea misdemeanor, 96 the court must read a mens rea require-
ment into RICO to avoid imposing a twenty year sentence without
proof of mens tea. 197 Scotto stated that Congress did not intend to
dispense with the mens tea requirement in enacting RICO. 198
Scotto urged that, in federal criminal law, the terms most con-
nonly used to denote mens tea for a serious felony are "knowingly and
willfully."' 99 He contended that the well established meaning of the
term "willfully" in the criminal context is "intentionally violating a
known legal duty."' 2°° Judge Stewart's instructions, on the other
hand, defined "willfully" as "done knowingly and deliberately with a
195 Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 27. Anastasio Brief, supra note 155, at 28-44. Judge
Stewart gave the following instructions regarding the mns rea requirement:
Fifth, [you must find] that the defendant acted wilfully and knowingly. You
must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew what he was
doing and that he did it deliberately and voluntarily and not because of a mistake,
accident, negligence or some other innocent reason.
An act is wilful for the purposes of this statute [RICO] if it is done knowingly
and deliberately with a criminal motive or purpose.
In determining whether the defendant has acted knowingly and wilfully it is
not necessary that the defendant knew he was violating any particular act or law.
It is sufficient if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was aware of the general unlawful nature of his act as alleged in the indictment.
Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 34.
196 Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 27 (citing United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299, 305
(1956); United States v. Ricciardi, 537 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 384 U.S. 942 (1966)).
197 Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 27. RICO itself has no mnas rea requirement, although
each of the predicate offenses, except the Taft-Hartley violations, require high degrees of men.
rea. Scotto cited United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978) to support
his proposition that a court may read a men. rea requirement into a statute even when the
statute is silent on men. rea. Scotto Brief, suqfra note 174, at 28. See also Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) (existence of mns rea is the rule, not the exception, in Anglo-
American criminal jurisprudence).
Scotto conceded there exist situations in which a court may dispense with a mns rca
requirement. See Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960). However,
Scotto argued that RICO does not fit within the exceptions outlined in Hodridge. Id.
198 "Surely if there had been any understanding that RICO was dispensing with mens rea
for a 20-year felony, Congress, or the ACLU would have commented on that point." Scotto
Brief, sufpra note 174, at 31 n.37.
199 Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 32.
200 Id. at 33 (citing United States v. Winston, 558 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1977) (court found the
jury instruction insufficient in a Railway Labor Act prosecution for failure to charge that the
defendants "voluntarily and intentionally" violated a known legal duty)). Sec also United
States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 11 (1976); United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973).
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criminal motive or purpose. "201 Scotto stated that the court's in-
struction failed to meet mens rea standards because the instruction did
not require the jury to find that the defendants had acted with intent
to violate a known legal duty (a duty not to participate in the con-
duct of the affairs of the I.L.A. through a pattern of accepting money
or things of value from employers of I.L.A. labor).20 2 Scotto further
urged that a more precise definition of "willfullness" is required be-
cause, technically, "willfullness" is also an element of the Taft-Hart-
ley misdemeanor offense.2 0 3 Scotto argued that Judge Stewart's use
of the phrase "criminal motive and intent" in the instruction might
have inferred the necessary mens rea required, but his later explana-
tion that the jury need only find "an awareness of the general nature
of his act" effectively destroyed the inference.
2 °4
The defendants argued further that the RICO conspiracy in-
struction,20 5 similar to the RICO instructions, did not require the
jury to address the particular mental element of a RICO violation
predicated on violations of the Taft-Hartley Act. Scotto used United
States v. Provenzano206 to contend that a person can not conspire to
commit a particular crime unless he is aware of all the elements of
201 See note 195 supra.
202 Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 34. Scotto conceded that the court need not have
instructed the jury that the defendants had to be specifically aware that RICO created the
"legal duty," although the defendants must have known that they were under a duty and
must have had a specific intent to violate it. Id.
203 Scotto contended "willfullness" in a Taft-Hartley violation means "merely acting with
knowledge of what one is doing, deliberately and voluntarily, and not by mistake, accident or
inadvertance." Id. at 35. Scotto urged this is a lesser degree of "willfullness" than RICO
should require.
204 Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 35. Scotto contended that an instruction requiring
general awareness was inadequate since one can be aware of the general unlawful nature of
an act without having a specific intent to violate a known legal duty. See United States v.
Heller, 579 F.2d 990, 999 (6th Cir. 1978); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107 (1945).
See also note 195 supra.
205 Judge Stewart gave the following instruction on iens rea for the RICO conspiracy
charge:
The Government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant you
are considering was aware of the conspiracy's basic purpose and object. That he
participated in the conspiracy with a specific intent, that is, a purpose to violate the
law.
So you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew
what he was doing, that he did it deliberately and voluntarily and not because of
some mistake, accident, carelessness, inadvertance or some other reason.
It is not necessary that the defendant knew he was violating any particular
law. It is sufficient if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he was
aware of the general unlawful nature of his acts.
Anastasio Brief, supra note 155, at 31-32.
206 615 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1980).
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that crime.20 7 Anastasio additionally contended that, even if the
RICO instructions were valid, the RICO conspiracy instructions
were still inadequate because courts always apply a stricter standard
in conspiracy cases.20
8
The government urged that the defense contentions fail on their
merits since Judge Stewart specifically instructed the jury to "distin-
guish between 'wilfulness' under RICO, wilfulness under the tax stat-
utes and the intent element under [the Taft-Hartley Act]. ' 20 9
Arguing that no single case can establish a definition to apply to all
criminal statutes, 210 the government cited case law stating that the
degree of criminal intent required depends on the context of each
individual case.21' The absence of an explicit mens rea requirement in
RICO indicates that Congress intended none. Reading in a mens rea
requirement would "undoubtedly narrow its application," and
would impede the congressional intent that RICO be "liberally con-
strued to effectuate its remedial purpose. ' 21 2 The government also
urged that the inclusion of a mens rea requirement in RICO would
not necessarily protect against untoward use of the statute. Rather,
the government suggested that it is the concept of the "enterprise"
that supplies the "significant unifying link," ensuring proper use of
the statute.
213
Finally, the government stated that Anastasio's call for a more
stringent specific intent requirement in conspiracy cases214 is "simply
not the law."' 215 Numerous cases, the government argued, hold that
the intent required to prove a conspiracy to commit a given offense is
no different than the intent required to show a violation of the sub-
stantive offense.2
16
207 Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 36 (quoting United States v. DeMarco, 488 F.2d 828,
832 (2d Cir. 1973)).
208 Anastasio Brief, upra note 155, at 30 (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 401
(1980)). The indictment did not include Anastasio in the substantive RICO count (Count
one), but did include him in the RICO conspiracy count (Count fifty).
209 Government Brief, supra note 53, at 42 n.*.
210 Government Brief, supra note 53, at 44.
211 Id. (citing United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973); United States v. Murdock, 290
U.S. 389 (1933); United States v. Tolkow, 532 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1976)).
212 Government Brief, supra note 53, at 45.
213 Id. at 46. The government further stated that, even if RICO were a "specific intent"
crime, Judge Stewart's instruction as a whole properly incorporated the essence of willfulness
under the appropriate standard. Id. at 46 n.* (citing United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387,
395 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1975), cer denied, 425
U.S. 958 (1976)).
214 See text accompanying note 208 supra.
215 Government Brief, supra note 53, at 47.
216 Id See United States v. Herrera, 584 F.2d 1137, 1150 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v.
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3. Inadequate Jury Instructions on Scotto's "Conduit" Defense
Scotto next argued that Judge Stewart improperly instructed
the jury on Scotto's "conduit" defense, and that the convictions on
certain section 186 (Taft-Hartley) counts should therefore be re-
versed.217 Scotto insisted that he was not the ultimate beneficiary of
the money he received, rather he was acting in an intermediary ca-
pacity. The court should have instructed the jury to find that Scotto
intended to retain any money he received before convicting him on
any Taft-Hartley violations.218 Scotto contended that unless he in-
tended to keep the money he received, he received no benefit or
"other thing of value" within the meaning of section 186(b).2 19
Scotto urged that Congress enacted section 186 "to prevent em-
ployers from tampering with the loyalty of union officials, and dis-
loyal union officials from levying tribute upon employers. ' 220 The
Mauro, 501 F.2d 45, 51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 969 (1974); United States v. Rosselli,
432 F.2d 879, 891-92 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971).
217 Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 38-43. Scotto's defense was that he transferred funds he
received to political campaigns. See text accompanying notes 115-118 supra.
218 The court's instruction was as follows:
The defendant Scotto contends as to certain but not all of these counts as
follows:
One, that the employer, here Mr. O'Hearn and Mr. Montella, delivered or
paid a sum of money to the defendant intending that sum of money should be
delivered or paid by the defendant in turn to the Cuomo campaign or the Carey
campaign.
And, two, that the defendant knew this and paid or delivered that sum of
money to the intended recipient.
And, three, that the recipient knew that the source of the sum of money was
the employer.
And, four, that the defendant did not benefit in any way by the payment or
delivery of the money to him, including the fact that he was the one who delivered
the money to the campaign.'
If you find that the payments were made under all of these circumstances, then
the Government has not met its burden of proof as to the second element and you
must find the defendant not guilty as to those particular counts.
Scotto Brief, spra note 174, at 39-40.
219 Id. at 40. Scotto conceded that the phrase "other thing of value" in the Taft-Hartley
Act was broad, citing United States v. Roth, 333 F.2d 450, 453 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 942 (1965) ("value" of any particular thing is set by the desire to have the "thing" in
question and depends on the particular circumstances), but he stated it was limited by court
decisions. Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 40 (citing Zentner v. American Federation of Musi-
cians, 237 F. Supp. 457, 463 (S.D.N.Y.), aj'd, 343 F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1965) (information about
an employer's employees is not a "thing of value" under § 186(b))). See also United States v.
Sink, 355 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D. Pa.), affdmne., 485 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1973) (reimbursement of
expenses not a "thing of value"); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 270 F. Supp. 280 (D. Mass.
1967), rev'd on other grounds, 397 F.2d 394 (1st Cir. 1968),fiidgment of district court reinstated, 394
U.S. 759 (1969).
220 Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 40-41 (citing United States v. Roth, 333 F.2d at 453).
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jury instruction, he argued, did not accurately reflect the statute's
purpose. It was thus improper to instruct the jury to base an acquit-
tal only on a finding that Scotto "did not benefit in any way" from
his intermediary capacity and "benefit" should have been clearly de-
fined for the jury.
221
Scotto next asserted that, even if he did receive an intangible
benefit by virtue of his intermediary capacity in passing funds to a
campaign, for this "benefit" to fall within section 186 it was neces-
sary that Scotto be aware of this benefit. Absent such knowledge,
case law mandates he be acquitted on the section 186 violations.
222
Scotto conceded that a jury instruction to this effect is unnecessary
when a defendant receives a tangible benefit (cash, property, etc.)
kept for his own use,223 but is essential when the benefit is difficult to
value or identify, such as "the gratitude of a politician or of the head
of a charity .... -224
Even if Scotto's argument were reviewable, the government con-
tended that it was without merit. Neither the Taft-Hartley Act itself
nor its legislative history suggests that section 186 is limited in appli-
cation to tangible "things of value."
225
221 Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 41. Scotto contended that his actions were:
not distinguishable from soliciting an employer to contribute directly to a political
campaign. Such a situation, too, could bring "benefit" to the union official, but
surely would not be covered by § 186. Rather, such conduct would be political
association protected by the First Amendment. Ste Bud/1q v. Va/eo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-
15, 21-22 (1976).
222 Scotto urged that knowledge of the benefit does not transform § 186(b) into a "specific
intent" crime, but only requires the jury to find that Scotto knew what he was doing. Scotto
Brief, .s pa, note 174, at 41-42 (citing United States v. Holt, 333 F.2d 455, 456-57 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied sub nom., Holt v. United States, 380 U.S. 942 (1965) (defendant must know
that he is receiving a "thing of value" and that it is being conferred on behalf of an employer
employing workers represented by the defendant)).
223 An example of a "thing of value" is the cabana, windows and doors mentioned in
counts 14 and 15. Certain intangibles also do not require this instruction if they are of obvi-
ous value, such as cancellation of a debt or an oral agreement to make a future payment of
money. Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 43.
224 Scotto urged that Judge Stewart's instructions, see note 218 sufira, vitiated his "con-
duit" defense, because the jury may have nevertheless believed that Scotto received a "tenu-
ous, speculative, and unquantifiable" benefit from being the conduit of the money. Id.
225 Government Brief, sufira note 53, at 52. The government argued that the accumula-
tion of a cash "kitty" with money being disbursed at will undermined Scotto's defense. See
note 93 sufira. Furthermore, the "conduit" transactions would still violate § 186(b) since
§ 186(b) prohibits all "deliveries" of money, while making no requirement that the receiver
ultimately retain any "benefit." Government Brief, supra note 53, at 52. Scotto, however,
never argued that § 186 did not apply to intangible "things of value." See Reply Brief for
appellant Scotto at 15, United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980).
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4. Inadequate Instructions on Tax Evasion Counts
Finally Scotto challenged the jury instructions pertaining to four
of the six tax evasion counts.2 26 Two of the tax evasion instructions.
related to payments that Scotto asserted he received only as an inter-
mediary.227 Judge Stewart's instructions failed to clarify sufficiently
to the jury that any intangible "benefit" he received from his inter-
mediary capacity would not sustain a conviction for tax evasion, un-
less the jury specifically found that the "benefits" were taxable
income. 228 Scotto conceded not raising the point at trial, but claimed
it was an oversight and not a strategy of counsel. 229 Nonetheless,
Scotto insisted that the incomplete instruction constituted "plain er-
ror" and required reversal, because the conviction would not be sup-
ported by a finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
element of the offense.
230
Scotto also challenged the last two tax evasion counts since
Judge Stewart failed to distinguish in the jury instruction between
the tax counts pertaining to Scotto's "conduit" defense (counts 55
and 56) and those counts pertaining to Scotto's defense of never re-
ceiving money (counts 53 and 54).231 Scotto asserted that neither the
court nor the government made any effort to focus on the tax counts
individually which resulted in a "substantial possibility" that the
jury considered all six tax counts as a group.
232
The government called the contentions on the tax evasion
counts "completely frivolous. ' 233 Trial counsel had not "overlooked"
226 Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 44-46, referring to counts 53 and 55 (tax evasion) and
54 and 56 (falsifying tax returns).
227 Counts 54 and 56.
228 Judge Stewart gave the following instruction with regard to tax evasion counts 51, 53,
and 55:
[The Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. . . that the defendant
had substantial unreported taxable income which he failed to report .... You
are asked by the Govenment to find that certain moneys and things of value were
received by the defendant and those moneys or things of value were income subject
to income tax.
Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 45.
229 Id. at 46 n.46. Scotto stated that the point was "subtle" and that the failure to per-
ceive it at trial was understandable given the complex nature of the case.
230 Id. at 46 n.47 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); United States v. Calfon, 607
F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1979) (failure to instruct adequately on essential elements of crime goes to
essence of case)).
231 Scotto conceded that Judge Stewart advised the jury of Scotto's contention that "cer-
tain funds he received were political contributions. . . ," but that the court never told the
jury precisely to which tax counts this defense applied. Id. at 47 n.48.
232 Id.
233 Government Brief, supra note 53, at 53.
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the issue as Scotto suggested, but raised it and even received a sup-
plemental instruction to dispel any confusion concerning the income
issue.2 34 The government also urged that the instructions adequately
defined "thing of value" in the section 186(b) instruction, 235 which
thus informed the jury that the term did not include vague intangi-
ble benefits. That definition in the section 186(b) instruction un-
doubtedly carried over into the tax counts. 236 Finally, the
government dismissed Scotto's claim that the tax evasion convictions
were invalid because Judge Stewart did not match the counts with
Scotto's defenses. Judge Stewart was under no duty to "marshall"
the defense evidence in his charge, and defense counsel did not even
request that he do so.
23 7
5. Miscellaneous Challenges
In a minor argument, Scotto stated that the Taft-Hartley viola-
tions were lesser included offenses in the RICO charge, and that the
court should vacate convictions and sentences on these charges.
23 8
Scotto argued that the government had to prove every element of a
Taft-Hartley violation as part of a RICO violation that is predicated
on a Taft-Hartley violation; therefore, the predicate offense is a lesser
included offense for which the court may impose no sentences. 239
The government countered Scotto's argument by citing the leg-
islative history of RICO, which explicitly stated that RICO imposes
penalties in addition to any other penalties which might be imposed
under existing law.24° In enacting RICO, Congress specifically in-
tended that the predicate offense would be separate offenses, and
234 This instruction was explicitly accepted as satisfactory by defense counsel. Id. at 54.
235 See note 219supra.
236 Judge Stewart gave the following section 186(b) instruction defining "thing of value":
"A thing of value can be any material thing with a monetary value such as a gift, services or
work performed or services supplied." Government Brief, supra note 53, at 55.
237 Id. at 54 n.*.
238 Scotto Brief, supra note 174, at 37-38.
239 Id. (citing Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, (1980) (offense of rape merged into
the offense of felony murder based on rape), quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299 (1932) (judicial assumption that "Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish the same
offense under two different statutes"); United States v. Sansone, 380 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1965)
(defining lesser included offenses); United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 725, 730-31 (2d Cir.
1966), crt. denied, 389 U.S. 80 (1967) (multiple sentences, even if concurrent, may not be
imposed for violation of a lesser included offenses)).
240 Government Brief, supra note 53, at 75 (citing Organized Crime Control Act, § 904(a),
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (RICO should be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purpose); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979)).
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could be prosecuted as such.241 Finally, the government suggested
that Scotto's argument was "illogical" because it would force the
government to choose between RICO and the predicate offenses,
thereby "seriously limiting the usefulness of RICO in cases involving
multiple predicate offenses .... *242
Anastasio, in a novel argument, asserted that, of the four types
of unlawful payments prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act,243 Con-
gress intended only the bribery prohibition of 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(4)
to be a predicate offense under RICO.244 He supported this theory
by examining the birth of RICO, the comments of RICO sponsor
Senator McClellan, and the Senate Reports, which specifically men-
tion bribery as a means used by organized crime.2 45 Anastasio ar-
gued that based on these indications, the legislative intent was to
include only the bribery prohibition of the Taft-Hartley Act as a
RICO predicate offense. Since the charges against both Scotto and
Anastasio revolved around violations of section 186(b), the court
should reverse the RICO and RICO conspiracy convictions.2 4
6
The government noted that Anastasio's argument had been re-
jected in three RICO cases that were based on the same predicate
acts of "racketeering activity" as found in Scotto247 Second, RICO
specifically enumerates as a "racketeering activity" any act "which is
indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186. . .", and
makes no distinction between a section 186(a) offense and a section
186(b) offense.
2 48
241 Government Brief, supra note 53, at 76 (citing S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
126).
242 Government Brief, supra note 53, at 76-77.
243 The Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (1976), forbids (1) payment to any labor
representative of the employees of the payor, (2) payment to any labor organization (or any
officer or employee of a labor organization) which is representing, or seeking to represent, a
defined employee group; (3) payment to any employee (in the form of "extra compensation")
to cause the employee to influence other employees regarding collective bargaining matters;
and (4) bribes to union officers or employees.
244 Anastasio Brief, supra note 155, at 44. Anastasio distinguished a contrary decision in
United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977), by noting that
the defendants in Kaye argued reading 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976) out of RICO altogether. See
also United States v. Field, 423 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afd, 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
aJ'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). Government Brief, supra
note 53, at 44 n.43 & 49-50.
245 S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 126, p. 158 (1969).
246 Anastasio Brief, supra note 155, at 48.
247 Government Brief, supra note 53, at 73 (citing United States v. Field, 578 F.2d 1371
(2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Stofsky,
527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975)).
248 See note 164 sura.
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C. The Second Circuit Decision
The Second Circuit affirmed both convictions.249 Before turn-
ing to the substantive arguments, the court discussed RICO generally
and observed that the statute had survived constitutionally based
vagueness challenges.250 The court also noted the wide variety of sit-
uations to which courts have applied the statute.
251
The court then decided the merits of Scotto's "conduct of the
affairs" argument, regardless of whether the defense waived the issue
by failure to raise it at trial.252 The court rejected Scotto's argument
that the district court must require the jury to find that the predicate
acts "concerned or related to the operation or management of the
enterprise" and "[a]ffected the affairs of the I.L.A. in its essential
functions. ' 253 The court adopted the reasoning of United States v. Stof
sky, 254 which held that RICO does not define the degree of interrela-
tionship between the pattern of racketeering and the conduct of the
affairs of the enterprise.255 The court stated that:
[O]ne conducts the activities of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering when (1) one is enabled to commit the predicate of-
fense solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise or involvement
in or control over the affairs of the enterprise, or (2) the predicate
offenses are related to the activities of that enterprise.
256
Noting that section 1962(c) does not require proof that the defen-
dant's activities advanced the union's affairs, that the union itself is
corrupt, or that the union authorized the defendant to do the acts he
did, the court held it unnecessary for an individual to "enhance his
position in the enterprise through commission of the predicate viola-
tions. '257 The court concluded that the instructions sufficiently em-
phasized the required connection between the predicate acts and the
249 United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980).
250 Id. at 52 (citing United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cer
denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976)).
251 United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 52-53.
252 Id.
253 See text accompanying note 182 supra.
254 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 819 (1976).
255 United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54.
256 Id. The court noted, however, that "[s]imply committing predicate acts which are
unrelated to the enterprise or one's position within it would be insufficient."
257 United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54 (quoting United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp.
55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
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affairs of the enterprise.258
The court found the RICO mens rea arguments raised by Scotto
and Anastasio unpersuasive. The court restated the doctrine of
United States v. Boylan that "[t]he RICO count does not include a sci-
enter element over and above that required by the predicate crimes,
in this case the violations of 29 U.S.C. § 186(b)(1). ' '259 Judge Stew-
art's instructions were held to be more than adequate. 260 The court
went on to hold that the instructions need not require a finding of a
willful violation of RICO.26 1 The court similarly dispensed with ap-
pellants' arguments pertaining to the RICO conspiracy convictions,
stating that:
If anything, the district court erred in favor of the appellants by
delivering this portion of the charge in which it implied that a spe-
cific intent to violate the RICO conspiracy provision was
required. 262
The court also dismissed the arguments that Taft-Hartley viola-
tions are lesser included offenses in RICO, 263 citing United States V.
Boylan26 and similarly dismissed the argument that a violation of 29
U.S.C. § 186(b)(1) is not a RICO predicate offense. 265 RICO's plain
language makes a violation of any part of Title 29 of the United
States Code sufficient to base a RICO conviction.
266
The court rejected Scotto's challenge of the instructions defining
"things of value" under section 186(b)(1),267 relying principally on
the government's waiver argument.26 The court also dismissed
258 United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The court noted Judge Stew-
art's instructions were clearer than those upheld in United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d at 989-
90, where the instruction merely tracked the language of § 1962(c). United States v. Scotto,
641 F.2d at 55.
259 United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 55.
260 See note 195 supra.
261 United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 55-56. The court distinguished United States v.
Winston, 558 F.2d 105, 107-09 (2d Cir. 1977), see note 200 supra, on which Scotto relied, by
noting that Winston involved the violation of a statute explicitly requiring a "willfull failure to
comply with the terms" of other subsections of the law. RICO does not have the same re-
quirement. See text accompanying notes 211-212 supra.
262 United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 56. See note 195 supra.
263 See text accompanying notes 238-239 supra.
264 620 F.2d at 361. The Second Circuit held in Boylan that RICO and § 186 violations
are "separate crimes, separately punishable," because they "do not proscribe the same act or
transactions, and they implement different Congressional purposes." Id.
265 See text accompanying notes 243-246 sup ra.
266 United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 56-57. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(c) (1976). See also
text accompanying note 248 supra.
267 United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 57. See text accompanying notes 217-224 supra.
268 See text accompanying note 225 supra.
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Scotto's challenge to the section 186 violation instructions for failing
to require a finding that Scotto knew he was receiving a thing of
value. The court held Scotto did not have to know he was receiving
a "thing of value," but required only an "awareness of the benefit
itself."269 The court also dismissed Scotto's argument that the tax
evasion instructions were inadequate for failing to better define a
"thing of value" in the tax evasion context, calling Scotto's argument
"farfetched" and speculative.270 Furthermore, the court held that
the district court was not required to explain to the jury the defense
theory behind each tax evasion count.
271
Finally, the court dismissed Anastasio's misjoinder argument
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b), because he failed to
raise it before trial as is required to preserve the issue for appeal.
272
Had Anastasio properly preserved the point, there were nonetheless




To date, the UNIRAC investigation has resulted in the convic-
tion of 110 defendants, fifty-two of whom were union officials. Nev-
ertheless, the investigation "has hardly caused a ripple on the
docks. '274 In February of 1981 the Senate Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations heard evidence that it is "business as usual" on the
waterfront.2
75
Such a result is frustrating in light of the extensive government
UNIRAC investigation into waterfront corruption. It remains to be
seen just how effective traditional RICO prosecutions like Scotto are,
even when they result in convictions.
Even though Scotto will not hold a union position in the New
269 United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 57.
270 Id See text accompanying notes 226-230 supra.
271 United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 57. See text accompanying notes 231-232 supra.
272 United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 62.
273 Id. at 58.
274 N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1981, at 8, col. 1.
275 Id. Most of the witnesses testified against Thomas W. (Teddy) Gleason, president of
the I.L.A. since 1963, stating that he is nothing more than a figurehead who is "owned" and
controlled by organized crime. The prinicpal witness against Gleason was George Wagner, a
former I.L.A. functionary. Wagner testified that Gleason had extensive contact with con-
victed racketeer George Barone. See note 46 supra. The FBI also introduced the transcript of
a taped conversation between William "Sonny" Montella, a key government witness against
Scotto, and Michael Clemente, a member of the Vito Genovese organized crime family, in
which Clemente told Montella that Gleason had been the "mob's choice" to succeed I.L.A.
President William Bradley in 1963. N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1981, at 8, col. 2.
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York-New Jersey area again because of the Waterfront Commission
Act,276 the federal laws will keep him from a union post in other
areas of the country for only five years after his imprisonment and
probation.277 Scotto is only forty-seven years old and could conceiva-
bly hold a union position in another area of the country in the future.
More significantly, even if Scotto never again holds a formal union
position, organized crime influence on the waterfront is so institu-
tionally entrenched that prosecutions of individuals will only take
one man from a position to make room for another.
278
An often overlooked yet powerful weapon in RICO is the broad
civil remedies provision of § 1964.279 Patterned after antitrust legis-
lation, the government has broad civil remedies and harsh civil pen-
alties at its disposal under RICO. Section 1964 provides for
"appropriate" injunctive relief for engaging in prohibited conduct.
The court may enjoin any individual or corporation from investing
in or operating a prohibited type of enterprise in the future, and the
court is additionally empowered to order divestiture or dissolution.
2 80
The statute even authorizes treble damages for injured persons and
reasonable attorney's fees.
281
Private parties, possibly attracted by the treble damages and at-
torney's fees awardable under § 1964(c), are beginning to use RICO's
civil remedies to a small degree.282 However, prosecutors, who are
more experienced in criminal matters, often overlook RICO's civil
provisions.28 3 Accordingly, civil remedies are rarely imposed in rack-
eteering cases.
284
Aside from the advantage of the less stringent standard of proof
in a civil case, there are other advantages to the government pursu-
276 See note 143 supra.
277 Id.
278 The UNIRAC investigation revealed the nationwide scope of waterfront corruption.
See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
279 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976) provides the district courts with authority to fashion appropri-
ate remedies to prevent and restrain violations of RICO, including forfeiture orders and or-
ders dissolving or reorganizing any enterprise after making due provision for the rights of
innocent persons. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976). It goes on to allow the Attorney General of the
United States to bring actions under § 1964, and provides jurisdiction to private individuals
injured in their business or property by a RICO violation, authorizing treble damages and
reasonable attorney's fees. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) & (c) (1976).
280 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976). See note 279 supra.
281 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976). See note 279 supra. See a/so Nathan, Prop osedAmendments for
RICO: Making A Crzninal Law More Civil, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 31, 1981, at 28 (discussion of
RICO civil possibilities for victims of securities and large contracting frauds).
282 See Nathan, supra note 281, at 28.




ing the civil remedies. The Senate investigation that followed Scotto
and the progeny resulting from the UNIRAC investigation 285 indi-
cates that criminal remedies, even when wide reaching, are not hav-
ing the desired effect on waterfront corruption.286 The criminal
remedies by necessity operate against the individuals within the cor-
rupt entities, but the civil remedies can be used to effectively erradi-
cate the corrupt entities themselves. Section 1964(a) allows the
federal district court to order the dissolution or reorganization of any
enterprise after making due provision for the rights of innocent per-
sons. 28 7 It is concededly a drastic measure, but the long history of
crime on the waterfront and the ineffectiveness of criminal prosecu-
tions may well warrant such a step.
Obviously, there is no single course of action that will effectively
remedy a situation that has existed since the turn of the century. The
situation will only worsen, however, unless the government and pri-
vate individuals victimized by waterfront corruption take decisive ac-
tion. The era of Kazan's "On the Waterfront", with open
corruption, violence, and terror on the docks, may be over because of
regulation and government intervention. However, the less visible




285 See text accompanying note.275 supra.
286 Id.
287 See note 279 .supra. The concept of the federal government dissolving a union is indeed
novel, and the myriad of potential problems was seen recently with the Reagan Administra-
tion's decertification of the Professional Air Traffic Controller's Union.
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